


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JPRS Report

Arms Control



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Arms Control

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Banning Arms Sales to Middle East Urged

*OW1609040892 Beijing XINHUA in English
0312 GMT 16 Sep 92*

[Text] Moscow, September 15 (XINHUA)—China today called on world powers to stop sales of sophisticated arms to Middle East countries so that a long-term peace in the region can be ensured.

The remarks were made by Sha Zukang, Chinese representative at the arms control and regional security working meeting of the Middle East multilateral peace talks, which opened here today.

"Developed countries exporting sophisticated weapons systems and their advanced parts to this region should pursue a responsible and prudent policy toward arms trade and exercise self-restraint," Sha said.

Meanwhile, in order to maintain peace and security, and to achieve a lower level of armaments, he said, it's necessary to prevent large quantities of arms from flowing into the region.

The Chinese representative also called on extra-regional countries, particularly powers having influence in the region, to respect the independence, sovereignty and security of Middle East countries.

However, the solution to arms control and disarmament issues depends primarily on the efforts of Middle East countries themselves, Sha said.

"We believe that on the issue of arms control in the Middle East, the proposals of the Middle East countries themselves must be listened to and fully respected," he said.

The Chinese representative called on Middle East countries to respect each other's sovereignty and refrain from interference in the internal affairs of each other.

Meanwhile, the Middle East countries "should not seek armaments and military expenditures exceeding their legitimate defensive needs," Sha said.

"Concrete steps toward Middle East arms control should, and can only, be initiated and agreed upon by Middle East countries themselves, through consultations and negotiations," he added.

China To Boycott Mideast Arms Talks Over F-16 Sale

*OW1709092292 Beijing XINHUA in English
0908 GMT 17 Sep 92*

[Text] Beijing, September 17 (XINHUA)—China will not attend the talks among the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council on arms control

in the Middle East, because of the United States Government decision to sell F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said here today.

Answering questions at a weekly news conference, spokesman Wu Jianmin said that the U.S. decision has totally violated the common guidelines agreed upon in meetings of the five powers on arms control issues which contains the principle that arms transfer should not be used to interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.

With regard to the Middle East peace process, Wu said, China has always taken a positive attitude.

"We hope that the Middle East issue will be solved in a just and lasting way on the basis of relevant United Nations resolutions," Wu said. "China has participated in the Mideast multilateral talks within the framework of the Middle East peace conference. China will continue to adopt a positive attitude on the issue."

President Calls for Southeast Asia Regional Security Plan

*OW1809084992 Taipei CNA in English 0819 GMT
18 Sep 92*

[Text] Taipei, Sept. 18 (CNA)—President Li Teng-hui has called for the establishment of a regional security system to maintain peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

Li made the appeal on Sept. 4 while meeting with a U.S. delegation touring this part of the world to help assess the Bush Administration's current policy vis-a-vis Communist China.

The U.S. group was led by Barber Conable, Jr., chairman of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and former president of the World Bank.

Other members included David Dean, adviser to the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange; John Galvin, professor emeritus of the U.S. Military Academy; David Lampton, president of the National Committee on the U.S.-China Relations; and Alfred Wilhem, Jr., vice president of the Atlantic Council.

The gradual U.S. military pullout from Asia may have a strong impact on the region's stability 10 years from now, Li told the delegation.

Other factors that may pose a threat to peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific region include Japan's adoption of the overseas peace-keeping force bill, Peking's announcement of territorial waters law, and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Seoul and Peking.

To fill in the vacuum arising from the U.S. military withdrawal, Li recommended that a fund devised to sustain peace in Southeast Asia be set up jointly by countries in the region.

"If possible," Li said, "I hope Asian countries can embark on disarmament."

POLAND**Russian Troop Withdrawals on Schedule**

*LD1009210992 Warsaw PAP in English 1712 GMT
10 Sep 92*

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 10—A programme of the withdrawal of the Russian Federation troops from the Polish territory runs according to agreed timetable, spokesman for the Government's Plenipotentiary for Monitoring the Russian Federation Troops' Stay in Poland Stefan Golebiowski said on Thursday [10 September].

Some 10,000 Russian troops are still staying in Poland after 2,350 soldiers were withdrawn from the country in August. There is also some military hardware left, including 63 armoured vehicles, 3 anti-aircraft guns, over 5,000 vehicles, four cargo planes and 2 helicopters but there are no tanks and combat aircrafts, Golebiowski announced.

The Russian troops vacated over 800 facilities on over 44,000 hectares of land. Six garrisons and three military ranges were also made available for inspection by the Polish units. All these places were declared safe.

The Government's Plenipotentiary for Monitoring the Stationing of the Russian Federation Troops in Poland Zdzislaw Ostrowski said that there are some 7,000 facilities to be taken over. "There is demand for abandoned buildings, but we have biggest problems with barracks, warehouses, depots and airfields. Polish Armed Forces do not want to take them over because they are relocated to the east," he added.

The operation is carried out without incidents. This is largely due to the fact that newly appointed commander of the Russian troops in Poland Gen. Leonid Kovalov gained experience, the plenipotentiary contended.

CUBA

Willingness To Sign Tlatelolco Treaty Reiterated

*FL1709013892 Havana Radio Rebelde Network
in Spanish 2300 GMT 16 Sep 92*

[Text] Today, Cuba reiterated its willingness to sign the treaty prohibiting nuclear arms in Latin America, once other countries in the region sign it. Andre Garcia de la Cruz, executive secretary of the Cuban Atomic Energy Commission [CEA], while speaking at the first session of

the International Atomic Energy Organization Governors Council, stated that Cuba has accepted the proposed changes to the document, which (Lou Verde) recently received in Mexico.

Garcia de la Cruz also said that amendments to the treaty from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, as well as modifications later suggested by Mexico, do not present difficulties for Cuba and are therefore acceptable. Remember that in October 1992, the Fourth Communist Party of Cuba Congress approved a resolution on foreign policies that expresses the country's willingness to assume the obligations of the Tlatelolco Treaty with regard to Latin American unity, when Latin America unanimously accepts them.

EGYPT

Egyptian Delegate Sees 'Slow Progress' in Moscow Arms Control Talks*OW1709215292 Beijing XINHUA in English
1954 GMT 17 Sep 92*

[Text] Cairo, September 17 (XINHUA)—The current arms control talks in Moscow are making slow progress, said a member of the Egyptian team to the talks.

In an interview with radio "Sawt al-'Arab" today, Muhammad al-'Amir said participants at the Moscow talks exchanged views about arms control and confidence-building.

The exchange of views on issues vital to the Middle East region marked some progress in itself, he added.

The arms control committee, one of the five formed by multilateral peace talks, began its meeting in Moscow Tuesday [15 September]. The agenda of the three-day meeting included discussion between Israel on the one hand and Jordan, Egypt, India and the European Community on the other. Palestinian, Lebanese and Syrian teams did not attend the meeting.

The current talks are the second round after the first round was held in May in Washington.

The Arab parties have time and again called for a balance of military power between Arab countries and Israel, considering such a balance the only means to secure peace and stability in the region.

They have demanded Israel's nuclear power be included in any disarmament plan for controlling weapons of mass destruction.

Al-'Amir claimed that Egypt is at the forefront of countries striving to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. At the request of the Egyptian Government, the issue was included in the agenda of the 98th Arab League Foreign Ministerial Council session held in Cairo on September 12-14 to forge a common Arab stand.

Last November Egypt proposed to the U.N. General Assembly that all countries concerned should commit themselves to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The proposal was approved by the assembly.

JORDAN

Delegation Departs for Regional Arms Talks in Moscow*JN1409065992 Amman JORDAN TIMES in English
14 Sep 92 pp 1,5*

[By JORDAN TIMES staff reporter P.V. Vivekanand]

[Excerpts] Amman—Jordan's delegation to the second meeting of the working group on regional disarmament left for Moscow Sunday stressing that the Kingdom's ultimate objective was a "weapons-free" Middle East.

Jordan's approach to regional disarmament is an insistence that all countries in the Middle East endorse the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and all other international conventions banning biological and chemical weapons, said 'Abdullah Tuqan, head of the delegation.

Dr. Tuqan noted that the discussions, which are part of the multilateral phase of the Middle East peace process launched in Madrid last October, remain in a "seminar format" and the outcome of the deliberations would "reinforce and complement" the bilateral peace talks between Israel and the Arabs.

"We hope to learn from the experiences (in the disarmament field) of other regions in the world such as Europe and South-East Asia and come up with ideas, means and modalities to apply the concept in the Middle East," Dr. Tuqan told the Jordan Times shortly before the departure of the delegation.

"Jordan, which always believed and behaved itself as a member of the international civilised community, bases its approach on an insistence that all countries in the region endorse and commit themselves to all international treaties on weapons of mass destruction, including the NPT and the existing and proposed conventions on biological and chemical weapons," Dr. Tuqan said.

"These are all non-negotiable issues; the endorsement of these treaties and conventions by all countries is a must," said Dr. Tuqan. "Our ultimate objective is to see a weapons-free Middle East.

"Regional security and stability depend not only on the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction but also an end to all forms of research for weapon development," Dr. Tuqan added, renewing a call for a total ban on the supply of technology and assistance to Middle Eastern countries to develop arms. [passage omitted]

Dr. Tuqan stressed that the working group on Middle East disarmament could turn effective in the regional peace process only after the bilateral Arab-Israeli peace negotiations make substantial progress towards resolving the basic issues at the core of the conflict—Israel's occupation of Arab territory, the problem of displaced Palestinians and water disputes. [passage omitted]

The Jordanian delegation to the Moscow conference includes two senior officers from the Armed Forces, 'Umar Nadif al-Turk from the Foreign Ministry and two officials from the Kingdom's embassy in the Russian capital.

GENERAL

NATO Contingency Plans for CIS Intervention Scored

924P0177B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by correspondent Vladimir Peresada: "Time To Sound the Alarm: NATO Strategists Look Eastward"]

[Text] Brussels—At the session of the council of the North Atlantic alliance held last November in Rome I asked NATO General Secretary Manfred Woerner: "Does the alliance have any plan of action in the event of the loss in the USSR of centralized control over nuclear weapons?" Such a turn of events had not at that time been ruled out in the West, but the question was clearly not to the general secretary's liking. Frowning, he said: "I would not want to discuss hypothetical situations here."

Woerner's evasive answer merely reinforced my suspicion that there is such a plan. And that, despite the "new strategy" anticipating cooperation with the East which was adopted in Rome, the North Atlantic alliance could, generally, have special versions of a "response" to a dangerous, from the West's viewpoint, development of the situation in our country or behavior of the former principal enemy. This suspicion arose because the possibility of the existence of such versions is in fact part of the actual strategy of NATO.

It has so happened that, accredited to the Brussels headquarters of the alliance, I have of late attended almost all NATO sessions, which have discussed various stages of the elaboration of this strategy. Beginning with the foreign ministers' meeting in the Scottish village of Turnberry, at which the NATO "restructuring" was launched. The proposition concerning the disappearance of the former "Soviet threat" was heard for the first time there in June 1990, and there was talk of the need for a reconsideration in the light of this of the strategic concepts of the times of the "cold war" and for extending the "hand of cooperation" to the USSR and the East European countries. The session's summary document was particularly striking in that it consigned the "Soviet threat" to oblivion without any postulate in exchange.

What was the explanation for this? NATO had initially intended, I was told here, making an increase in trust shown toward us dependent primarily on the scale of the USSR's military potential. That is, tying the new strategy mainly to the task of the elimination of our advantages in arms, both nuclear and conventional, in the Western sector. This was a perfectly realistic approach based on an assessment of Gorbachev's European policy. His statements concerning an abandonment of the confrontation with the West were accompanied by practical steps which guaranteed with interest that the "Soviet threat" would rapidly lose its military aspect.

But several months later not a trace remained of the "Turnberry equability." There were two reasons, and they are interconnected. First, recognition of the fact

that there was no longer the constantly disquieting "eastern factor" on the continent called in question, if not the fate of NATO, then, at least, the expediency of its former "defense functions" in West Europe. There were in NATO circles many opponents of such a prospect feverishly seeking something with which the bloc might "occupy" itself together with the problem of disarmament. Second, in the process of the development of new doctrines the leadership of the alliance, although having taken account of Gorbachev's "guarantees," nonetheless proceeded primarily from the actual situation in East Europe, particularly in the USSR. And it was developing such that we were essentially ourselves presenting NATO with an alternative to the disappeared "Soviet threat."

In the summer of 1990 even the term "risk factor" had appeared in NATO's vocabulary. It was employed for the first time in a directive on the development of a new strategy, which was produced by the July top-level session of NATO in London. The Soviet Union was not at that time being identified separately, it was a question of, as a whole, "crisis situations in East Europe not without danger for the countries of the alliance." But subsequent events, primarily the rapid deterioration in the internal situation in the USSR, which was fraught with the danger of its disintegration into mutually hostile states and the fragmentation of its nuclear and other arsenals, forced the NATO strategists to dot the "i's." The declaration of the Rome session ranked with all certainty among the "risk factors" the Soviet Union, which, it was emphasized, "is experiencing a difficult political evolution" and "has, as before, here impressive military potential."

The Belovezha Pact on the liquidation of the USSR exceeded NATO analysts' most pessimistic forecasts. There should be no confusion as regards the alliance's position on this question, which our "democratic" press usually presents as unequivocally positive. Yes, in all documents of the "post-Belovezha" period NATO recognizes the new political reality in the former Soviet Union. This is understandable, for the collapse of a "communist," "deideologized," and even, had it been such, bourgeois-capitalist, but, in any event, strong state which had since the times of Peter even been a force to reckon with, is objectively favorable to the West, and not only the West. At the same time these same documents literally exude concern for Western countries' security in connection with the possible consequences of the disintegration of the USSR.

I do not doubt that the former "Soviet space" is now being seen in NATO as "risk factor" No. 1. This is not being said officially, but far more is being done than in any other area for the purpose of neutralizing the "post-Soviet unpleasantness." Colossal efforts were expended, for example, on preventing the appearance in the place of the USSR of several nuclear states (it is, clearly, not simply the problem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons as such but also of a hope of narrowing the former scale of our "nuclear geography"); to prepare for operation under the new conditions of the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (acute unease in NATO was caused by the intentions of the former republics to have their own armies and, accordingly, by the fate of the arms' "ceilings" specified by the treaty at a time when the USSR was still in existence); to push us into the swift elimination of a considerable number of tactical nuclear weapons.

The last mission is particularly symptomatic. Who would have thought that NATO, primarily the United States, which had for years opposed similar Soviet proposals, would suddenly be fervent disarmers in this sphere. And would, in addition, promptly realize its own initiative advanced literally on the eve of the collapse of the USSR (it was announced recently that the American tactical nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery at NATO's disposal had been removed from Europe). But the explanation was quite simple. These weapons, from which the European part of the former Union is to be "freed in response," are the most dangerous from the viewpoint of loss of control over them.

But all these are the visible insurance measures, so to speak. There are others also—the special versions of a "response" whose possible existence was mentioned at the start. Quite recently REUTER "managed to get hold of" a confidential document prepared last December at the meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels, which discussed, in the main, the situation in East Europe. It provided neither more nor less for the possibility of "selective nuclear strikes in crisis zones." It is not hard to guess, I believe, to which zones reference is made. As is well known, there are in the east of the continent simply no territories other than the CIS, Russia, mainly, which have the necessary nuclear component for this.

It is significant that this document appeared immediately following the Belovezha decisions. Those among us who believe that on the bones of the USSR NATO is prepared to fraternize virtually with the new "democratic regimes," with Moscow particularly, should take this into consideration. As, equally, the fact that such reports are not "gotten hold of" just like that, publicized even less. This was undoubtedly an organized leak.

And does NATO's decision to put its structures, armed forces included, at the disposal of the CSCE for peace-keeping operations in Europe not put us on our guard? This decision also, incidentally, was adopted following the disintegration of the USSR, for there had previously been no serious basis for such (until most recently NATO had held aloof from the Yugoslav crisis). And it also, in my view, is in the category of special "response" measures. It is specified, it is true, that a request and mandate of the CSCE will be determining for such operations. But what of that? Under the conditions of constantly multiplying conflicts not susceptible of settlement, the Karabakh or Dniester conflicts, for example, it cannot be ruled out that there could be both a request and a mandate and that, instead of UN international forces, which have hitherto been sent to "flash points,"

there would ultimately be the forces of the North Atlantic alliance. Which, in fact, is already the case in a "sea version" off the shores of Yugoslavia. Without any authority on the part of the CSCE, what is more.

How are we to understand this? In the wake of the precedent in the Persian Gulf a new, even more provocative precedent is being set: The West's military-political organizations, NATO primarily, are arrogating to themselves the right to power "peace-keeping" functions in Europe.

And it is incomprehensible why the leaders of the CIS are remaining silent in this connection. Why is Moscow keeping quiet when the Balkans is a traditional sphere of Russian interests and Russian influence? Is it not clear that the naval operation in the Adriatic is also a trial balloon directed toward us: Will it be swallowed or not? Perhaps there were consultations with us in advance? Perhaps the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, to which all members of the CIS have been admitted, was convened? No, it was not. The newly baked partners were simply ignored.

The fact that other participants in the CSCE found themselves in the same situation is hardly any consolation. To judge by what is contemplated by NATO's strategic developments, we should be sounding the alarm loudest of all. And what is most important—we ourselves should be putting our own house in order as soon as possible, before it is too late.

Program Reports on 'Secret Nuclear Town'

LD1009220392

[Editorial Report] Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian at 1922 GMT on 9 September, in its "Black Box" program, carries a 40-minute recorded feature called "The Closed City [Peredacha Vtoraya]", second in its series "The Secret of Nuclear Weapons."

The program begins with an unidentified correspondent introducing clips from a film produced by Mikhail Romm, "Nine Days of One Year," about a nuclear physicist involved in secret work on a nuclear accelerator to achieve thermonuclear synthesis and who ended up in a clinic following repeated doses of radiation.

The fate of such scientists was only revealed in May 1992, when a television crew was permitted to go to a secret nuclear town in the Urals, which was long hidden, even from the CIA.

The crew was allotted nine days to make their film about the closed town. On day one, the TV crew flew to a town which is not designated on any Soviet map. Film of the town is accompanied by some rhetorical questions as to what the town is like and whether Russian nuclear physicists will start to go abroad.

In the hotel, the TV crew heard people speaking about a strange "green emission" into the atmosphere in one of

the squares on the outskirts of the town. Their escort denied knowledge of any such emissions.

Academician Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Avrorin, head of the institute in the town, states that the town was set up to create an atomic bomb. A few details of Avrorin's career are given and how he came to work at the secret nuclear center on the shores of Lake Sinara, near Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk. The town was like a back-up center in case the major center, Arzamas-16, should need replacement.

Avrorin speaks about the restrictions imposed on the town's residents, such as the need for permission to invite people to the town, to go abroad, telephone calls being tapped, and mail being checked, which he explains as the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the leaking of state secrets. Nuclear missiles abroad are aimed at this town, and therefore its residents are live targets.

Chelyabinsk-70 or Snezhinsk are the names of the town. The configuration of a snowflake, the town's symbol, is reminiscent of an explosion in its outlines, the correspondent says. The film shows various residential districts of the town.

Avrorin says that people's moods have changed as they realized that they have been responsible for something detrimental to mankind, rather than something important and needed.

V.P. Laushkin, a senior research assistant and candidate of Technical Sciences, and V.M. Ivanov, a leading designer who composed the town's own anthem, are introduced to the TV crew.

Avrorin gives details of how people were selected for work in this town. There were even many non-party people.

Avrorin is interviewed by the TV crew in Moscow before going on a business trip to the United States. Avrorin says that he can now name his institute, address, and telephone number, although for many years he was bound by secrecy. He says that the type of secrecy varies in Russia and the United States. Avrorin's institute is called the All-Russia Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics. The video features the meeting of scientists in America.

The institute is said to be responsible for the "green release," which the TV crew manages to film. Video shows a townscape with a misty green outline around the buildings and other objects.

On day two, the TV crew, who do not yet have full permission for their filming, are permitted to film the checkpoint at the entrance to the town, which is surrounded with barbed wire and a ploughed strip and guarded by soldiers with machine guns. Filming of soldiers was restricted, and then prohibited completely.

The unidentified correspondent says: "They took us to Lake (Sumgul). Here there was forbidden zone B, at the end of the 1940's. Our candidates and doctors of sciences, from among prisoners, of course, together with German scientists who had been taken prisoner, under the leadership of the convicted Academician Timofeyev-Resovskiy, carried out top-secret research on the effect of radiation on live organisms. After all, practically nothing was known of that secret phenomenon then. A dangerous background of radiation has persisted up until our day. One finds dirty spots of contamination in places on the soil." The video shows the lake.

In spite of the contamination, the Orlenok pioneer camp for the children from the town is located on the shores of the lake. A howitzer at the camp is shown, which was once at the epicenter of a nuclear explosion. Video shows the pioneer camp.

The town's main sociologist, V.N. Osipov, candidate of Economic Sciences, recounts that the town was created overnight in 1956 and speaks about the demographic situation in the town.

Kirill Ivanovich Shelkin was the first head of the institute, followed by (Sbabakin) in the 1960's and by Academician Avrorin in the 1980's. In the next five years, the original scientists, who are in their fifties and make up the town's main potential, will retire. Avrorin speaks about the very small influx of young specialists to the town, less than 3 percent of new staff are being taken on each year. But the young people in the closed town desire freedom.

A young unidentified man from the town shows the TV crew his cartoons, indicating how the people in the town are like prisoners, bound and gagged, and shows a cartoon of a multi-limbed man with "I will not forget the 1957 explosion" tattooed on his chest.

Academician Avrorin speaks about the danger of a brain drain, about the possibility that people will go and work in the West. In some branches of the Academy of Sciences, almost half of the staff are already working abroad, he says.

On day three of the TV crew's visit to the town, sirens sound while the crew is visiting the town, but people in the streets take no notice. The siren was evidently sounding from the secret production facility.

The "secret production facility" will be dealt with in the next "Black Box" program of Black Box, the correspondent announces. The date and time of the next segment are not announced.

Yeltsin Message to Pugwash Conference in Berlin
LD1309015192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 2100 GMT 12 Sep 92

[Text] The 42d session of the Pugwash Conference has opened in Berlin. It will concentrate on the dangers of and prospects for our common future. The head of the

Russian delegation, Vitaliy Goldanskiy, has read out a message of greeting from President Boris Yeltsin. Dr. Goldanskiy is a member of the Pugwash executive committee.

President Yeltsin is pointing out that the threat of direct nuclear confrontation has ceased. He feels humanity must focus on the regional and interethnic conflicts, international terrorism and environmental problems. The international community must work hard to solve these problems.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Confirms CFE, START Obligations

*OW1609103392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1010 GMT 16 Sep 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov reconfirmed the willingness of the republic to adhere to international obligations on conventional armed forces in Europe and reduction of strategic nuclear forces, he declared at his meeting with a member of the German Bundestag Willi Wimmer on Tuesday [16 September] in Kiev. The Minister stressed that Ukraine "is strictly pursuing the way to a non-nuclear status".

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

Rethinking of Parity, Sufficiency Called For

*924P0177A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 28 Aug 92 p 4*

[Article by Aleksey Arbatov, director of the Arms Monitoring Center: "Russia's Strategic Dilemmas: Notes Prior to the Parliamentary Hearings"]

[Text] So, the big debate is in the offing. For the first time not for show (so that, it is said, everything will be as it is in the American Capitol) but entirely in earnest.

In the not-too-distant future the new treaty on a radical reduction in strategic offensive arms will be put to the verdict of parliament and public. It is being completed on the basis of the Framework Agreement of Presidents Yeltsin and Bush of this June. And even now it is evoking in Russia very varied and very strong feelings. There can be no doubt that the opposition is preparing to give great battle and will be fully armed with figures, facts, and calculations, with which it is being furnished from "primary sources." The debate is, in fact, already gathering pace, and the treaty's opponents are maintaining that it hurts us unilaterally and undermines strategic parity. But the treaty provides for a reduction to equal ceilings of 3,000-3,500 warheads by the years 2000-2003. For the first time in a quarter-century of negotiations the United States has agreed here to count warheads on heavy bombers not in accordance with artificially understated factors but in accordance with their actual armament. This means that it is to reduce

from the present actual level more than 10,000 warheads, we, approximately 7,000. Also for the first time Washington will limit its principal component of strategic offensive arms—the warheads of the sea-launched missile force—to a level of 1,700-1,750 warheads, which is one-third of the present level and half than that planned in accordance with the July 1991 treaty.

The supporters of the treaty frequently argue that it is time, finally, to cast aside the archaic concept of parity, although it is this which the Framework Agreement does not abolish; it simply establishes it at a lower level. They say in addition that there are sufficient forces for deterrence as it is. But this depends on the kind of missions and under what conditions the strategic offensive arms are capable of accomplishing to ensure deterrence. The strategic forces must correspond to the set assignments in terms of manning level, structure, and specifications.

It is these questions which contain the hidden essence of the disagreements between the opponents and supporters of the treaty. Continuing to gloss over it would be the same as playing a game on different boards and according to different rules. This would engender in society mutual misunderstanding and intolerance and prevent politicians adopting rational decisions both at the negotiations and in respect to military organizational development.

A key point of the new agreement is not only and not so much the overall ceiling of 3,000-3,500 warheads as the ban on ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. The ground-based missiles have traditionally constituted the mainstay of the Soviet strategic forces and their operational plans. The multiple-warhead ICBM's account for more than 60 percent of our strategic offensive arms in terms of warheads (with the United States, less than 15 percent).

The ban in 10 years' time on this type of arms confronts Moscow with a difficult dilemma. One possibility is to deploy 1,000 or more single (that is, with one warhead) ground-based missiles (there are now approximately 300 such new ICBM's) in order to preserve for this component of the triad 50 percent of the warheads within the overall ceiling of 3,000-3,500. An alternative is to add only 200-400 single-warhead missiles and thereby fundamentally break with the traditional strategic offensive arms structure inasmuch as the proportion of the ground-based component would then be reduced from 60 to 15-20 percent.

The first path would require great expenditure, particularly if for survivability purposes the ICBM's were deployed on mobile launchers, not in launch silos. And this in parallel with the elimination of approximately 750 (6,000 warheads) MIRV'd missiles, including 1,500 ICBM's of the latest models. In the forecast economic situation such costs could prove prohibitive.

The second version would sharply impinge on the interests of the leading arm of the armed forces—the Strategic

Rocket Forces, which are responsible only for ground-based ICBM's and which have always been predominant in the strategic triad. But it is not only a question of the departmental interests of the Strategic Rocket Forces, although they perform an enormous role in the army. The leading role of silo-based multiple-warhead missiles with thousands of warheads is inseparably connected with a particular strategic philosophy and understanding of parity and the requirements of security and stability.

Specifically, the priority of the ICBM's is connected with the fact that what is understood by parity is approximate equivalence with the United States in the capacity for delivering both a disarming (counterforce) strike against the opponent's strategic forces and a strike against his administrative-industrial centers. The main operational concept here is a counterstrike [vstrechnyy] or retaliatory-counterstrike, that is, a launch of the missiles before the enemy's warheads reach their target. The warning, command, control and communications system is also structured on this basis. Otherwise, given modern target accuracy, even ICBM's in the most hardened silos would not survive, and the functioning of the command and control system in a nuclear situation would be altogether unpredictable. The parameters of retaliation were set in thousands of warheads delivered to target (since as of the end of the 1970's there was no shortage of warheads with the deployment of MIRV'd systems).

The June Framework Agreement thoroughly undercuts these concepts and plans. You could not amass sufficient single-warhead missiles to raise in a single launch such a number of warheads. Mobile launchers are a two-edged sword also. Keeping them constantly on the move is costly and entails great wear and tear, but in stationary shelters they are even more vulnerable than in silos. In addition, mobile ICBM's are less adapted for a counter-strike, and their survivability comes from mobility, not rapid launch.

The proportion of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) will, according to the new treaty, grow with us from less than 30 to more than 50 percent in terms of warheads (if we opt for the full amount at the level of 1,700-1,750 warheads). We would not have to build new missiles or submarines, and of the available 59, over 30 of the old missile-firing submarines would be scrapped, and approximately 25 submarines would remain.

The main problems of the sea-launched missile force are the one-way and unreliable communications with the submerged boats and their vulnerability for the powerful antisubmarine warfare [ASW] forces of the United States and its allies. For this reason the SLBM's have always performed a backup, as it were, and not entirely predictable role in Soviet operational plans.

Bombers occupy an even more modest place in our strategic forces and plans than the sea-launched missiles. Their modernization has practically ceased, and their future is greatly in doubt.

As far as the United States is concerned, in accordance with the agreement it has to cut a considerable number of missiles (including new ones like the Peacekeeper and the Trident 1), submarines, and bombers. It has wound down a whole number of programs unilaterally (see S. Rogov, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 31 July 1992). But the structure of its strategic offensive arms remains almost unchanged, as also its underlying strategic principles.

The Americans will keep 500 Minuteman-3 ICBM silos, leaving three warheads on each of them, and will complete the construction of 18 Ohio-class submarines with Trident missiles (which will have, it is true, according to the agreement, half the number of warheads which was planned originally). Approximately 100 bombers will be fitted with cruise missiles. In sum, the United States could have far fewer vulnerable forces and an appreciable advantage in the capacity for killing both military and industrial targets.

Obviously, the considerations expressed will prompt many of our specialists, from the Strategic Rocket Forces particularly, to oppose the new agreement. Their opinion cannot be casually dismissed on the grounds that we and America no longer consider ourselves enemies. If we intend in principle to preserve strategic forces after the year 2000, a better mode of their existence than as survivable and reliably controlled retaliatory strike potential has not yet been devised. The sole alternative is a first-strike potential, which we and the Americans have consciously abandoned.

And so the criteria of parity and sufficiency can and should be reconsidered in the light of the new political situation. For example, is equality in terms of counterforce potential necessary? After all, the capacity for destroying strategic forces on either side necessarily implies a preemptive strike and the equivalent vulnerability of these forces on the other side. A counterforce parity race would increase mutual first-strike possibilities and create a strong incentive to preempt an opponent in a crisis situation.

And, on the contrary, measures to enhance the survivability of one's own strategic offensive arms would not create a threat to the other side and would at the same time objectively reduce its first-strike capacity. This would ensure stable mutual deterrence.

Further, does it make sense continuing, as in the tension years, to rely on the counterstrike concept? After all, the time of the missiles' approach to target is only 15-30 minutes. This leaves the president one or two minutes for the adoption of an apocalyptic decision on a nuclear launch—and this assuming that all warning and command and control systems work ideally. The counterstrike concept effectively deprives the political leadership of control over the most important conceivable act of state policy. What can be decided in two minutes, on the basis, what is more, of the unintelligible signals and

reports of the operators? No more than is decided by a performing monkey when, at a light signal, he pulls on the lever.

The need for the highest automation and speed of command makes the president's control via the notorious "football" highly ornamental. Which was manifested at the time of the putsch last August (see V. Stepankov, Ye. Lisov, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 21 August 1992). This largely gives rise to the probability of an accidental nuclear war (see V. Belous, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 14 August 1992). In a crisis situation the danger of a nuclear strike by mistake increases in geometrical progression, particularly under the conditions of the emergence of new nuclear powers with ballistic missiles.

Whence the need for transition to the principle of a purely retaliatory strike in order that the president might adopt a carefully weighed decision, having evaluated the address of the sender and the consequences of the strike. Silo-based MIRV'd missiles are too vulnerable to serve as the basis of a new strategy; the launch-or-lose rule operates with them. For this reason a shift of emphasis to more survivable, even if less fast-acting, systems, like mobile ICBM's and SLBM's, would be necessary for us in any case.

Of course, large capital investments in a restructuring of the command and control systems and an increase in their invulnerability and the dependability of communications with the mobile and underwater missile forces will be required. But the outlays here would be an investment in one's own and general security with the highest rate of interest. In the form of the political leadership's actual control over nuclear decisions included.

It may be said that a purely retaliatory strike would require large effective forces, for without a counterstrike launch far fewer of them would survive. Yes, this is true. But perhaps the criteria of retaliation have been unduly overstated since the times of nuclear abundance? A sober assessment of the realities of Hiroshima and Chernobyl testifies that unacceptable damage is gauged not in hundreds and thousands but rather in dozens of megatonnes. The more so when the parties do not have political reasons for conflict, and nor are such foreseen.

In this case the potential limited by the Framework Agreement would be sufficient in assurance of the survivability of the forces and their command and control systems for deterrence with interest. Supplementary measures at the negotiations on its completion should contribute to the same goals.

For example, it would be important to legalize the parties' unilateral initiatives and reach agreement on the centralized warehousing of the nuclear arms of bombers under mutual control. This component, which is the most effective for the United States and which threatens our mobile ICBM's, would be removed from the frame of the balance of combat-ready forces.

Abiding by the traditions of former treaties, a sublimit on the total number of ICBM's and SLBM's could be established—2,000, say. Moscow proposed such a ceiling on all forces at the start of the year, so let it apply to combat-ready (missile) weapons. Since a maximum number of warheads has been established for ICBM's (which equals one), why not do the same for SLBM's, four, for example. This would limit the number of warheads on alert status at sea and, consequently, the threat to mobile and silo-based ICBM's and command and control centers.

Expanded confidence-building measures in the sphere of the strategic forces and notification of exercises and other activity, up to and including the exchange of permanent representatives at bases, warehouses, and command and control centers, would be useful. Why not, if we are not intending to fight and are planning to create joint systems warning of a missile attack? It is time to provide politically binding guarantees of a winding down of ASW activity and to renounce submarine operations off the shores of another country. Monitoring this is difficult, but the probability of an encounter, as in the Barents Sea recently, would be a sufficient deterrent factor.

Inasmuch as the parameters of a retaliatory strike will have been radically lowered, we should be extremely cautious in approaching the idea even of limited ABM defenses. Without the preservation of the ABM Treaty the entire logic of the reduction and restructuring of strategic offensive arms and the revision of nuclear strategy could be undermined.

Finally, it is maintained that deep cuts are too costly. But even these outlays may be reduced. By reaching agreement, for example, on the possibility of reducing forces by way of the advance de-mating of the warheads from the missiles and their warehousing under mutual supervision. This, incidentally, would make it possible to rapidly "neutralize" missiles deployed outside of Russia.

And why is expenditure on disarmament and control altogether frequently viewed as "unproductive," for that matter? From the viewpoint of the end product—security—it is better for both parties to incur one-time expenditure on these measures than to invest money in arms which are intended never to be used, but merely replaced by increasingly new and more costly generations of them.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Efficacy of Strategic ABM Systems Denied

924P0179A Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS
in Russian 3 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Anatoliy Kravtsov: "Impossibilism Embodied in the ABM System; Where Have the Billions Gone?"]

[Text] Russia advertised the aerospace achievements of its military-industrial complex for the first time in the middle of August. "MosAeroshow-92" was an impressive sight, especially when the exposition is viewed from the heights of a balloon.

There were rows of airplanes, helicopters, and amphibious vehicles. Then there was a display of the battle systems capable of destroying all of these wonders of aerodynamics: anti-aircraft complexes, powerful mobile radars, missile launchers, and anti-aircraft missiles. There were the S-300 V, Buk, and Tor anti-aircraft missile systems, which I took part in developing. I, a devotee of aviation who had dreamed of devoting my life to it, had taken part in the development and production of these weapons for the destruction of aircraft by the will of the military-industrial complex, which had called the civil engineer up for military service.

When I looked at the missile launchers of the S-300 V system, the 10-meter aluminum drums—the transport and launching containers—I had a clear vision of the cone-shaped missiles inside, above the spherical gas generators that use a thousand atmospheres of pressure to hurl the bulky 5-tonne objects a hundred meters into the air, where the missiles begin to dip slightly until the starter engines go to work. The observer sees only this, because the missile then seems to disappear without a trace (after accelerating at such a high speed), and in 20 seconds he sees fire, smoke, and the flying charred chunks of the target plane 40 kilometers in the distance.

At "MosAeroshow-92," the S-300 V system was advertised as an effective ABM system. The high-level officials who came to see the exhibit, such as the vice president, the speaker of parliament, or the defense minister of the Russian Federation and others, may have already been persuaded that ballistic missile defense is possible and necessary for the territory of Russia and its troops, but is this really true?

More than 20 years ago, when we, a handful of military representatives in the Novator Design Bureau, were asked to report on the blueprints for the 9M82 missile, the 9A82 missile launcher, and the ground equipment of the S-300 V system, we expressed our appreciation of the anti-aircraft properties of the weapons of this system, but we also demonstrated that the designers' estimates of the kill probability and kill zone for missile targets were false. However much our arms were twisted by near and distant Moscow bosses, we refused to budge and we stated these conclusions (although I am sorry to say that we were not insistent enough) in our report. The report was sent to the chief client...and was ignored. The subsequent experience of ground, flight, and other tests and hundreds of thousands of adjustments corroborated our findings. No matter how much the system's designers tried to meet the assigned tactical requirements by undertaking a whole series of modernization efforts, they never managed to do this, but the sons of the military-industrial complex—the Ministry of the Aviation Industry, the Ministry of the Radio Industry, the

Ministry of Defense, and others—had to perpetuate the illusion of ballistic missile defense in the minds of the powers that be. They spent around 6 billion rubles—hard rubles, not the wooden rubles of today—on this dream of the politicians, who wanted to frighten the whole world with our nuclear missile strength while hinting that we ourselves were invulnerable.

It would have been all right if the money had been wasted only on blueprints, but it took so much metal and manpower to satisfy these ambitions. They built cities around Moscow, locating them on ABM circuit zones, and installed antiballistic missiles, including some with nuclear warheads, launchers, and powerful radars there, taking huge areas of territory away from the users of the land. I once asked two lieutenant colonels who were serving in one of the circuit cities whether they believed that their combined unit could defend Moscow against missiles. They replied with eloquent smiles and shrugs.

We have to give the Americans credit for their extremely clever and subtle efforts to maintain the illusion of the feasibility of ballistic missile defense for decades, motivating us to spend more and more billions on counter-productive projects. They pretended to be afraid of these weapons, feeding us carefully timed doses of information and disinformation to urge us to waste more money. They, on the other hand, did not go into financial ruin over a disadvantageous ABM system and did not deploy the Safeguard system, although they did peddle some missile thresholds in negotiations. Our military leaders were quick to take the bait.

After managing to stay afloat through all of the "perestroykas," the creators of these complexes (no, not just the design engineers, but the people at the top, the generals and the chiefs and staffers of departments of the Russian Federation Ministry of Industry) are still soliciting allocations for this.

I will not bother the reader with technical calculations, but I have to say that even the developers of the system admit that the kill probability of the interceptor missiles is so low that it would take a triple volley to reach even the 90-percent level. A particularly dangerous target, however, must be destroyed with a probability factor of almost one. Furthermore, the attacking missile is of a simpler design and is cheaper. The antimissile complex (or system) consists of extremely complex and expensive missiles and up to five other highly complex units (guiding and detecting radar units, missile launchers, etc.). One triple volley of this kind would cost a couple of million rubles—in old rubles, or tens of millions at the new exchange rate. This would all be done just to shoot down a single missile. This is almost literally a case of using cannons to shoot sparrows. I have not even mentioned the reliability of our equipment; the references to our highly reliable military products are outright deception. They are just as unreliable as our television sets and the other equipment produced by the same plants.

Although we might be able to endure all of these shortcomings when we are firing at planes, completely different criteria have to be employed when we fire on a missile with a megaton nuclear warhead. But let us assume that we are technically capable of the 100-percent defense of Moscow, St. Petersburg, or Nyu Vasyuki. We will leave the technical and economic aspects behind and discuss only the issue of general organization. The global ABM system or the joint SDI system proposed by lobbyists from the military-industrial complexes of the United States and the Russian Federation will be operated and turned on by human beings. We should recall how young M. Rust flew over fields sown with missiles, antiaircraft guns, and fighter planes for six hours, and until he landed a hundred meters from the office of the commander in chief of the USSR Armed Forces, the generals were still deliberating: To shoot or not to shoot? Airplane or guest? We should also recall how G. Schneider visited Batumi, the capital of the Adzhar ASSR, three years later and then flew away unimpeded, leaving a basket of flowers and a note behind. We should recall how the Boeing 747 was shot down in 1983. Of course, those generals and marshals deliberated the matter for just under three hours before they gave the order to shoot down the civilian aircraft. What could our generals manage to do within the few minutes of the flight time of a missile (with several maneuverable warheads)? From Grozny or Konstantinopol, for example. These instruments of blackmail or of a genuine threat would reach the ground before the generals could discuss the matter and order their destruction. I am not even mentioning the other, non-missile means of delivering the weapons of deranged politicians to presidential mansions. They will be delivered wherever, God help us, they are sent.

People make references to historical experience, to the impenetrability of the air defense systems of the capitals in World War II. We should recall that Chamberlain, Churchill, and Hitler were assured of the 100-percent safety of their capitals by generals, but what was left of London and Berlin? Stalin was assured that not one bomb would fall on Moscow, but even Moscow, which was protected by almost 600 fighter planes and more than 1,000 antiaircraft guns and was shielded by barrage fire, suffered its share of strikes. More than 200 Fascist bombers dropped their payloads on the capital. Moscow's defenders had to put out 45,000 fires within the city limits. Even the heart of the city, the Kremlin, suffered damage. A building across from the Rossiya Hotel is missing one of its top corners. This was not an architect's whim; it is a gaping war wound.

London's highly reliable air defense system repelled attacking planes but was unable to withstand the V-1 and V-2 missiles, although its effectiveness sometimes reached incredible levels, destroying 90 out of 94 missiles. Nevertheless, London was ravaged: 2,400 of the 8,000 V-1 missiles that were dropped on London reached their targets. In addition, another 517 V-2 missiles exploded in London. We can imagine what

would have happened if the Germans had managed to develop a nuclear filler for these missiles.

This is what our experience tells us, and it cannot be refuted even by the modern wonders of the scientific and technical revolution, among which the development of weapons of mass destruction is prominent. There are no weapons of mass defense. The apologists for the ABM system have not been idle, however, and have made repeated attempts to undermine even the ABM Treaty.

Their strong pressure has influenced the behavior of presidents. In January 1992, B. Yeltsin stated a fact: "The ABM Treaty...is an important factor in the maintenance of strategic stability in the world." This was followed, however, by a surprising remark: "We are willing to continue the unbiased discussion of the American proposal regarding limited non-nuclear ABM systems...." He did this even though many scientists had proved the practical and theoretical impossibility of developing an effective ABM or SDI system, etc.

Let us assume, however, that this would be possible. Weapons as complex as the SDI system would have to be tested and could not simply be substantiated with theoretical computations and verified by simulation. The system would have to be tested in action, and this would be impossible not only for the system as a whole, but even for its large subsystems. As an observer and a direct participant in the perfection and testing of ABM weapons, I have to say that these system-wide tests are impossible, and separate tests of each "brick" are no substitute for a verification of the functioning of the whole system. The very first time the ABM system is used against a real target will be a system-wide and natural case, without any kind of provisions or facilitation.

The creation of an effective global, limited, or zonal ABM system is comparable to the graphic art that was just recently given the explicit name of "Impossibilism." A beautiful graphic design meeting all of the strict rules of perspective depicts mansions in which a person climbs numerous flights of stairs and ends up in the same place, in the same cul-de-sac. All of these ABM systems are just as impossible as some of the block structures. The absolutely impenetrable ABM system is also impossible. Any absolute ABM system (which would be the only kind worth having) is unrealistic. An absolute global system is even more unrealistic. It cannot be achieved—not by the American military-industrial complex, and not by one combined with the Russian or even the Japanese and European military-industrial complexes, at any price whatsoever. This, however, is not as obvious as the triangular block design. This fact does come to the attention of politicians, but the ABM advocates are quick to toss more wood on the dying embers.

The joint statement issued by the two presidents in Washington during B. Yeltsin's June visit to the United States, regarding the two countries' concerted effort to plan a global system of defense against "limited" missile

threats, attests to the strong influence of the American and Russian ABM lobbyists. They will not give up: By hook or by crook, they will involve space and the whole universe in the arms race and fill them with scrap, rubble, and debris.

Our ABM advocates have been more lively recently. They are already saying that they have learned to change the trajectory of flying objects. Regrettably, there are no funds for this. If they could only have some money, the new discoveries of mechanics and aerodynamics could be converted into explosions, dust, etc. American military scientists, who are more experienced in demanding funds for weapon projects, are approaching the matter from another direction. Teller, the father of two sisters—the nuclear bomb and the SDI—is already saying that the SDI system could be used to preserve the ecological balance. This will be followed by hundreds and thousands of persuasive arguments, which will be hurled at people to convince them to finance these projects. One thing will remain the same, however: Even if the whole world should become preoccupied with the ABM system, it will be infeasible. It is impossible!!!

Stability cannot be maintained in the world with the aid of ephemeral military projects and new rounds of the arms race.

'Space Forces' Unit Based in Crimea

924P0180A Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Russian 5 Sep 92
p 2

[Article by V. Savchenko, correspondent: "Are 'Star Wars' in Store for Ukraine and Russia? It's a Complete Secret"]

[Text] The latest achievement of Soviet space technology is our unique, multiple-use spacecraft, which has been taking off and landing in the relatively deserted steppes of Kazakhstan. Everybody knows this. But what virtually nobody knows is that a backup landing strip for this extremely complex engineering complex has been set up and fitted out in the Crimea. A command-metering complex is also located there; and a division of "space force" military personnel has been stationed there. In general, there are various opinions as to the feasibility of deploying such space forces in the rich and pleasant Crimea. But, in any case, what kind of military-service branch would this be without its own base in that resort-type peninsula? It's not fair.

In short, the division established itself quietly and peacefully, and there were only a few people who knew about it. In general, the commanders of our "Star Wars" are not talked about and even less written about. Nor was this matter touched upon amid the passions which swirled around the dividing up of the army and the fleet. There would seem to have been no doubts evoked concerning the strategic purpose of this division, nor—therefore—about its being subordinate to Marshal Shaposhnikov's department. Furthermore, the Ukrainian leaders never mentioned the plans connected with

the "Star Wars." But nowadays all that is behind us. A modest-sized division has a chance to shake things up even more than the problem of dividing the Black Sea Fleet.

According to a report from the press center of the "Crimea with Ukraine" Public Organization Committee, this division has taken an oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people, and the blue-and-yellow flag has been ceremonially raised over the staff headquarters of the command-metering complex. Serving as examples were Colonel Gennadiy Samarin, the division's commander, and Colonel Valeriy Solovyev, the commander of the complex, who is also a member of the Crimean Supreme Soviet Presidium.

This step was brought about more by political considerations than by military feasibility. The fact of the matter is that the basic purpose or mission of the "space force" unit is anti-missile defense. This was supposed to cover the entire territory of the former USSR and its allies in the Warsaw Pact with an invisible "umbrella." There is no longer a USSR or Warsaw Pact. But the "umbrella" remained. Now it does not exist either. In the specialists' opinion, an "umbrella" with holes in it is tantamount to having none at all. Within the present-day economic situation, Russia will hardly be able to find the funds for restructuring the entire system of anti-missile defense. And it would be utterly senseless or meaningless for Ukraine to acquire its own little piece of a "nuclear umbrella."

At the same time, however, the military people have not forgotten to remind us that the Western missiles are still aimed—just as they were previously—at Russia and at Ukraine.

But this is from the viewpoint of the military people. With regard to the political aspects, there is an utter lack of clarity on this matter. The possibility that Yeltsin and Kravchuk discussed this problem in Mukhalatka has not been ruled out; it is even possible that Bush has been kept posted and well-informed regarding it. In that case, of course, no serious complications are to be foreseen. Alas, there has not yet been any information on that score. At the press conference held in Mukhalatka we included this point in the list of questions submitted to the two presidents. But neither Yeltsin nor Kravchuk even touched upon it. And so we may more likely assume that the disintegration or collapse of the former USSR's anti-missile defense could lead to a new, upward spiral in the tension between Russia and Ukraine. "Star Wars" could become a reality in the Russian and Ukrainian staff headquarters and parliaments.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Ukrainian Defense Enterprise Joins in CFE Implementation

LD0509093992 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 0500 GMT 4 Sep 92

[Text] Another Ukrainian defense enterprise has joined in the implementation by Ukraine of the treaty on

reduction and restriction of conventional arms in Europe [CFE]. It is the Zhitomir plant for the repair of military machines. At the moment, a batch of military infantry carriers [boyova mashyna pikhoty] and armored personnel carriers is being dismantled there. Military monitors from the United States, Great Britain, and Spain acquainted themselves with the process of carrying out those tasks at the plant. This was reported by the press service of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry.

Belarus Wants Speedy Troop Withdrawal

*LD1009202592 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1718 GMT 10 Sep 92*

[By BELINFORM correspondent Larisa Lazar for TASS]

[Text] Minsk September 10 TASS—The Belarusian Security Council demanded that the republic's government and Defence Ministry work out a schedule of a speedy withdrawal of strategic troops from the Belarusian territory and draft the corresponding agreement with Russia. The meeting of the Security Council in Minsk on Thursday [10 September] was presided over by Stanislav Shushkevich, president of the council and head of the parliament.

Questions of the military doctrine of the state have been discussed and will be submitted for parliamentary endorsement. The government and Defence Ministry have been instructed to work out in detail the economic substantiation of the plan for military construction, specifically to ensure social guarantees by the state for servicemen discharged from the forces.

Landsbergis Says Troop Pullout Great Victory

*LD1209165192 Vilnius Radio Vilnius
in English 2300 GMT 10 Sep 92*

[Text] The agreement on the Russian Army's withdrawal from Lithuania should be considered as a great victory of democratic forces of Lithuania and Russia, and a big step toward cooperation and normalizing the relations between the two countries, said Chairman of the Supreme Council Vytautas Landsbergis speaking at the parliament today [10 September].

The agreements signed in Moscow should be valued as a great achievement of Lithuania's international policy. Mr. Vytautas Landsbergis asked the MP's to avoid using the wrong interpretation of the agreement on the Army withdrawal in the election campaign and to consider state interests prior to (?group or) party interests.

The parliament leader expressed hope that the pullout would be friendly enough and said that Lithuania would provide every assistance for the smooth pullout.

The date of the final withdrawal is 21 August 1993, but (?the) division stationed in Vilnius is to be withdrawn already this year. The political agreement between the

two countries has not been signed yet and certain positions are still to undergo some coordination as President Boris Yeltsin did not agree on some points in the already prepared and coordinated document. The next summit meeting is planned for 1 and 2 October.

Mr. Vytautas Landsbergis has also informed the MPs about (?an unofficial) meeting with Russia's State Secretary Gennadiy Burbulis, during which problems related to former Lithuanian deportees and their families still living in Russia, settling accounts between the two countries, juridical assistance and some other questions were discussed. The chairman also reminded about the currently continued talks on economic relations for this and the coming year and has pointed out that Russia's problems always tell on Lithuania too. Thus political and diplomatic work requires that maintaining of trade and economic relations with Russia would not enlarge Lithuania's dependence on Russia's (?direct) problems.

Lithuanian Defense Minister on Troop Withdrawal Timetable

*OW1109204392 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1852 GMT 11 Sep 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Lithuanian Home Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius told the newspaper "LIETUVOS RYTAS" that the full schedule of Russian troops' withdrawal from Lithuania will not be announced until a separate agreement with Russia. The minister noted that "implementation of the schedule started on September 8".

The minister said that by the end of November "not a single Russian soldier should stay in Vilnius". In an interview with BF [BALTFAX] the Commander of the 107th Motorized Infantry Division stationed in Lithuania Colonel Valeriy Frolov was reluctant to comment on reports about the start of the withdrawal. He only noted that "if corresponding agreements are signed, his division is prepared to leave the Lithuanian capital".

Butkevicius claims that already this year a Russian airborne regiment will be withdrawn from Marijampole. According to him, a regiment of the 3rd Coast Guard Division will also be withdrawn from Talsiai (Lithuania), as well as some smaller units.

Butkevicius said that remaining Russian border guards will leave Lithuania's Baltic coast within days.

[In a related report carried in the same facsimile transmission at 1852 GMT on 11 September, BALTFAX says the newspaper EKHO LITVY has published regulations governing the conduct of Russian military personnel in Lithuania. The regulations were agreed upon during a recent meeting between President Vytautas Landsbergis and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The regulations "prohibit Russian troops from using training grounds and forest districts for their purposes, from patrolling

territory within the boundaries of military areas, and from conducting reconnaissance activities.”]

Estonia Repeats Demand for Russian Withdrawal

*OW1409172292 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1554 GMT 14 Sep 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Estonian State Minister Uno Veering told BALTFAX that Estonia continues to demand the withdrawal from the Republic of Russian offensive forces and troops stationed in Tallinn by the end of this year. All remaining units, he said, must be evacuated in 1993.

According to the Minister of State, Estonian specialists are currently conducting an expert review of the withdrawal plan for 1993 presented by Russia last week. The plan was proposed during the September 9-10 round of negotiations between the countries, at which the Russian delegation proposed their troops be fully withdrawn in 1994. The plan was neither discussed nor agreed upon during negotiations, said Veering.

Belarus To Ratify CFE ‘By End of Year’

*LD1509142192 Hamburg DPA in German
1333 GMT 15 Sep 92*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The westernmost CIS republic, Belarus, intends to ratify the CFE Treaty on limiting conventional armaments in Europe by the end of the year. This was stated by President Stanislaw Shushkevich today in talks with Federal President Richard von Weizsaecker and Federal Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. Shushkevich announced that things are going relatively well for Belarus compared with the other CIS members. However, the republic will remain in the ruble zone for a long time because of its economic ties.

According to the Foreign Ministry, Kinkel and Shushkevich agreed on the drafting of a joint declaration as the basis of broad cooperation. The Belarussian president agreed to appoint a personal representative to implement German humanitarian aid. Constitutional reform in 1993 is to guarantee the transition to democratization and the market economy.

Latvian Decree on Troop Talks With Russia

*OW1509184992 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1613 GMT 15 Sep 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Monday [14 September], the Latvian parliament passed a decree on interstate negotiations with Russia concerning the withdrawal of Russian troops.

The document contains four main principles for future negotiations:

—the unconditional withdrawal of all troops in 1993

—the recognition of international treaties and internationally recognised common borders, including those established between Russia and Latvia by the treaty of 1920 which defines Latvia’s current territory, including the Pytalovo region (currently part of Russia);

—recognition of the inability to naturalise new citizens before the withdrawal of occupying troops and the recognition of the right to resolve matters of citizenship of the republic only for its own citizens;

—the necessity for all Russian military detachments on Latvian territory to observe the schedule set by the Latvian leadership for the withdrawal of troops and restrictions on their activity on Latvian territory until withdrawal is complete.

Russian Envoy Concerned Over Troop Talks With Latvia

*OW1709171492 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1645 GMT 17 Sep 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] However difficult Russia’s economic situation could be, it would not tolerate the language of ultimatums,” [no opening quotation marks as received] said head of the Russian state delegation at the talks with Latvia, Ambassador Sergey Zotov, in an exclusive interview for BALTFAX.

In his words, it most directly relates to Latvia which “obtained independence from the hands of Russian democracy and whose economic success will hinge on its economic relations with Russia for many years to come”.

The Russian ambassador expressed concern over the recent resolution by the Latvian parliament regarding the issue of the Russian troop withdrawal from its territory. The Latvian government resolution requires that the republic’s government resort to the language of ultimatums at the talks with Russia.

In the opinion of Ambassador Zotov, the authors of this resolution, apparently, seek to block the bilateral talks which are due to be held September 22-23 in Riga, leading them to the blind alley, and then accusing the Russian delegation of its recalcitrant stance and artificially over-dramatizing the problem of the troop withdrawal at the international level, including the UN.

The Russian delegation is coming to these talks with “preparedness to do everything possible for finding mutually acceptable solutions, showing maximum understanding, forbearance and restraint,” Mr. Zotov said. After so many significant concessions have been made as regards the issue of the troop withdrawal, the Russian side has every reason to expect the Latvian side to cover its own half of the way, he noted. If the talks do not succeed, the responsibility for the stalemate at the talks will be vested with those who still have illusions

that Russia could be spoken to from the positions of ultimatums, Mr. Zotov noted.

In the words of the Russian diplomat, "the initiative by the Russian government at the meeting August 6 of the Baltic and Russian foreign ministers in Moscow provides an entirely new platform for working out an agreement for the troop withdrawal". On August 6, the Russian side proposed to radically reduce the terms for the troop withdrawal and complete this process in 1994 on the basis of a complex solution of all the issues, presenting interest for the parties concerned.

The Russian ambassador also had to note with regret that opportunities for capitalizing on these highly favorable prerequisites are gradually dwindling due to the 'adverse atmosphere in the countries' bilateral relations which is played up by the Latvian radical nationalistic forces". [no opening quotation mark as received]

The Russian side, the diplomat emphasized, also regards as "unfriendly gestures" the attempts undertaken by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to bring to the agenda of the current session of the UN General Assembly the issue of the Russian troop withdrawal rather than try to find a constructive solution to this issue in the process of the countries' bilateral talks.

The intent of this "maneuver", in the opinion of Mr. Zotov, is to divert the attention of the international community from "flagrant and multiple cases of human rights violations in Latvia and Estonia, which should have long become a subject of concern and discussions at the level of international agencies, including the UN".

Troops Preparing To Withdraw From Lithuania

*OW1809122292 Moscow BALTFAX in English
0950 GMT 18 Sep 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian commanders are getting ready to withdraw their troops from Lithuania in earnest, said the Lithuanian government's representative in charge of the Soviet troops' removal Stasys Knezis. He told BF [BALTFAX] that since the end of August, the Lithuanian National Security Ministry has been receiving applications from the Russian garrisons for permits to move equipment and other property out of Lithuania. He said that some of the garrisons have already sent their trucks with equipment back to Russia.

The 107th motorized infantry division located in the so-called Northern Town in Vilnius is getting ready for withdrawal, too. The first column of trucks has been given permission to leave Lithuania. Before the end of the year, about 1,500 soldiers and officers are expected to leave the Northern Town.

Stasys Knezis said that smooth withdrawal is being hampered by the absence of a political agreement between Vilnius and Moscow on the compensation for

the damage inflicted on Lithuania by the Soviet army, which is to define which military equipment should remain in Lithuania. Meanwhile Lithuania is trying not to give Russia any pretext for accusing it of hampering the withdrawal, stemming from the consideration that before the conclusion of an agreement on compensation the Russian commanders will not have enough time to remove much of the military equipment.

Knezis said that since the beginning of the year the number of Russian military personnel has gone down by 12,000 men. There are about 22,500 Russian servicemen in Lithuania who will have to leave that country by August 31, 1993.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Comprehensive Test Ban Said Workable

*924P0181A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Sep 92 p 4*

[Article by Aleksandr Sanin (Advanced Research Center, Russian Academy of Sciences): "The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban May Become a Reality"]

[Text] One of the most urgent problems of the present day would seem to be the problem of the universal prohibition of nuclear tests for the purpose of stopping what might be the most dangerous process ever engendered by human civilization—the development and upgrading of nuclear weapons.

We must find a way out of the state of nuclear confrontation which could have disastrous consequences and stop seeking nuclear advantages over the other side as a means of safeguarding our own security.

The problem of banning nuclear weapons and nuclear tests became relevant virtually at the time these weapons first made their appearance, and then a mass movement for a nuclear test ban came into being in different countries at the end of the 1950s.

The USSR resolutely supported the prohibition of all tests of nuclear weapons from the very beginning. In fact, by 1946 our country had already submitted a draft international convention to the UN Atomic Energy Commission on the assumption of commitments by states not to use atomic weapons and to eliminate their stockpiles within three months. The adoption of this convention at that time would have resolved the issue of excluding nuclear weapons from the arsenals of countries and precluding the production of fissionable materials for weapons, which had been accumulated in only the most negligible quantities by that time. Their destruction would not have presented much difficulty, but history refuses to be written in the subjunctive mood, and it decided otherwise.

The thunderous sound of nuclear explosions were heard first on test ranges in the former USSR and the United States and then in England, France, and China. The two

great powers began a nuclear race and justified it by insisting on the need to maintain the military-strategic balance based on nuclear forces and weapons. The appearance of a new nuclear missile system on one side would tip the balance, and the other side would try to compensate by developing its own nuclear systems. Then the balance would be restored on a higher level, distinguished by increasing instability.

Now there are more than 50,000 nuclear warheads in the world. The continued accumulation of nuclear weapons would serve no military-strategic purpose. The nuclear arsenals of the two sides are so well-balanced that neither could win a war even if it were to start the war. American military experts describe this situation as the state of "mutual assured destruction." According to former U.S. Secretary of Defense R. McNamara, "unacceptable losses" would be caused by a nuclear strike with a total yield of 400 megatons, which represents from one-seventeenth to one-twentieth of the combined yield of the nuclear warheads in the current inventory of the United States and the CIS.

Now it will take a great deal of money and effort to eliminate the huge nuclear stockpiles, and we have to look for ways of putting hundreds of tonnes of weapon-quality uranium and plutonium derived from nuclear warheads to peaceful use and converting them into energy.

In May 1955 the USSR submitted a proposal on the cessation of nuclear tests to a subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission for consideration. In May 1958 we declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, which was later repeated several times. In July 1963 we declared our willingness to begin the process by concluding an agreement prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.

The treaty banning these tests, which was signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963, was the first major victory in the struggle to curb the nuclear arms race. It recorded the intentions of the USSR and United States "to achieve the discontinuance of nuclear tests for all time."

A comprehensive nuclear test ban began to be negotiated by the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR in 1977, but the talks were never completed. At the end of 1990 the USSR and United States ratified the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Tests and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Tests for Peaceful Purposes.

In January 1991 an international conference was held in UN headquarters in New York to discuss the possible amendment of the 1963 treaty to prohibit all nuclear tests in all spheres. This amendment was not adopted, however, and this was primarily due to the position the American side took under the influence of the U.S. military-industrial complex, which insisted on the continuation of nuclear tests for the purpose of developing

new nuclear arms and modernizing existing ones and of securing the reliability and safety of the nuclear arms in service.

Just recently the Senate of the U.S. Congress approved a nine-month moratorium on nuclear tests, to be followed by their complete prohibition on 1 October 1996.

The senators made this decision against the administration's wishes for several reasons:

- the principal and fundamental factor contributing to this decision was probably the end of the "cold war" and the prospect of sizable arms reductions and the elimination of U.S. and CIS nuclear arms;
- the American public's environmental concerns, which led, for example, to the closure of all of the nuclear reactors producing weapon-quality fissionable materials. The production of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium has been suspended in the United States;
- the apparent agreement of many members of the U.S. Congress with the need to begin negotiating a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

The former USSR had always declared its willingness to stop all tests if the United States were to take similar steps, and it announced several unilateral moratoriums on nuclear tests while the tests continued in the United States. Even now, a one-year moratorium on these tests is in effect in our country in line with the Russian president's directive of 26 October 1991.

In view of the considerable improvement in CIS-U.S. relations, the treaty concluded in 1991 on the reduction of strategic offensive arms, the framework agreement on the more radical reduction of these arms before 2000-2003, the mutual initiatives on the elimination of tactical nuclear warheads, and the latest positive American Senate resolutions on nuclear tests, it would be advisable to resume the mutual efforts to find a final solution to the problem of prohibiting nuclear tests.

The conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban by Russia and the United States, as the leading nuclear powers, would give them an opportunity for joint action in the drafting of a universal test ban. After all, it is due to the successful joint efforts of the former USSR and the United States that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has already been signed by 138 countries.

"The best way of deterring China and other countries is the discontinuance of our own tests. For years we preached nuclear non-proliferation to other countries, and now we have to let them know that we practice what we preach," Senator E. Kennedy said.

An international conference was held in Geneva in August and September 1990 for the discussion of certain aspects of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and revealed the wishes of neutral and non-aligned countries to enhance the effectiveness of the

treaty by immediately prohibiting all tests. This could preclude the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a whole group of countries trying to acquire them, such as Iraq and others.

According to UN data, around 2,050 nuclear tests were conducted between 1945 and 1991, with the former USSR accounting for 715 of the tests and the United States accounting for 1,080 (the rest were conducted by Great Britain, France, and China).

This number includes explosions on nuclear test ranges and explosions for peaceful purposes.

The danger of nuclear tests is corroborated by several facts:

- at this time nuclear tests are primarily securing the development of nuclear weapons of the third generation (or directed-energy nuclear weapons)—weapons in which much of the energy of the explosion takes forms other than a shock wave and radiation. The development of these weapons would signify a new round of the nuclear arms race and would destabilize the military-strategic situation in the world. One of the main arguments recently cited by the advocates of continued nuclear tests was the need to enhance the safety of nuclear warheads. According to several experts, however, this would require only a few tests. This is corroborated, for example, by a study conducted by Livermore Laboratory nuclear arms designer R. Kidder at the request of the U.S. Congress in 1991, in which he demonstrates that it would take no more than 10 tests to solve the safety problem;
- nuclear tests are a form of destabilizing and destructive competition between the United States and Russia. According to foreign data, the cost of a single underground nuclear test in a shaft ranges from 6 million to 20 million dollars, and a test in a horizontal tunnel costs from 40 million to 70 million dollars;
- the nuclear tests in the atmosphere created a global surplus of radiation on our planet. There was virtually no radioactive strontium-90 on the surface of the Earth before the first nuclear tests. By 1981 the total quantity of strontium-90 produced by all of the nuclear tests and its global accumulation, excluding local fallout in the test zone, were equivalent to around 10 Mc, and the quantity of cesium-137 was around 25 Mc—respectively 50 times and 25 times as great as the quantities of strontium-90 and cesium-137 discharged into the atmosphere by the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in 1986. By 1970 around 6,000 Mc of tritium, or an amount exceeding the natural content by a factor of 10^8 , had been formed and had entered the stratosphere and troposphere, and also the hydrological cycle of the Earth in the form of tritiated water, as a result of nuclear tests. The total activity of the radiocarbon accumulated in the atmosphere as a result of nuclear tests was equivalent to around 6 Mc by 1981, whereas the natural content of carbon in the atmosphere is only around 0.1 Mc—i.e., only one-sixtieth as much;
- nuclear tests represent primarily a means of nuclear proliferation. The tests by the main depositary states of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the former USSR and the United States, cannot strengthen the framework of nuclear non-proliferation. In 1995, when the world community will have to renew the treaty, several countries on the threshold of developing their own nuclear weapons will have to decide whether or not they wish to remain party to the treaty. Their positive decision will depend largely on whether or not the CIS and United States can stop their nuclear tests. If they do not stop them, the undesirable process of nuclear proliferation may begin in the world.

We have to realize that there are virtually no obstacles to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty even from the standpoint of verification possibilities.

We know that the treaties between the former USSR and the United States on the limitation of underground nuclear tests and on underground tests for peaceful purposes were not ratified for 16 years because the American side was not satisfied with the verification technology. Their ratification became possible in 1990 after protocols were signed to authorize the use of national technical means of verification and to grant the verifying party the right to use the hydrodynamic method of measuring the yield of underground explosions, conduct on-site inspections, and implement the seismic method of verification with the use of three special seismic stations on the territory of the side conducting the tests. According to experts in our country and abroad, the new technical procedures could serve as the basis for the verification of a comprehensive test ban. Besides this, a comprehensive ban would be simpler to verify than a limited ban.

We should say a few words about the so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, which may be used for the construction of canals, the stripping of mineral deposits, the creation of underground reservoirs for the storage of petroleum products and nuclear waste, the intensification of oil and gas exploitation, and so forth.

The former USSR conducted 115 nuclear explosions of this kind in various regions, and there were around 15 such explosions in the United States. The last peaceful nuclear explosion was conducted in Turkmen Oblast in summer 1989. The search for ways of using peaceful nuclear explosions in the United States came to an end long ago, and other countries do not conduct these explosions.

The possibility of destroying industrial waste, chemical weapons, and the weapons-grade uranium and plutonium removed from eliminated nuclear warheads with

the use of underground nuclear explosions has been debated recently. Several options have been considered:

- the isolation of toxic industrial waste by pumping it through underground shafts, in which nuclear explosions have been set off, into the cavity of the so-called demolition column created by the destruction and collapse of the underground test housing;
- the destruction of chemical weapons and weapons-grade fissionable materials directly in tunnels by setting off underground nuclear explosions;
- the use of the uranium and plutonium recovered from nuclear warheads slated for destruction in nuclear charges for peaceful explosions, which would reduce the cost of the charges.

Although the problem of waste elimination and disposal is crucial, the use of nuclear explosions for these purposes would require the most thorough and comprehensive investigations.

Lowering the cost of peaceful nuclear charges by using the uranium and plutonium from eliminated warheads would also present problems. Given the accumulated supply of these materials (according to foreign sources, there are around 100 tonnes of plutonium and 500 tonnes of uranium in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and we probably have approximately the same quantity), it would take tens of thousands of peaceful nuclear explosions, and this kind of "conversion" is certainly less feasible than the energy conversion of weapons-grade fissionable materials—i.e., their combustion in energy nuclear reactors.

In spite of all the precautions taken in underground nuclear explosions, they are a major source of radioactive pollution and could contribute perceptibly to the radiation background along with all of the anthropogenic activity of the human being.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban would stop the development of new nuclear arms, raise the level of stability in the world considerably by reducing the danger of nuclear war, strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation framework under strict international control, and improve the ecological climate on earth dramatically.

In view of the latest resolutions of the U.S. Senate, the consistent willingness of the CIS to be party to a mutual ban on nuclear tests, and the broad anti-nuclear movement throughout the world, there is a real chance of a comprehensive nuclear test ban by 1995.

French TV Examines Legacy of Soviet Nuclear 'Crimes'

92WN0769A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Sep 92
Morning Edition p 6

[Article by Yuriy Kovalenko, IZVESTIYA correspondent, Paris: "On the Trail of Nuclear Catastrophes: The

Investigation of French Television Journalists Carried Out in Russia and Kazakhstan"]

[Text] They called their trip to the former Soviet Union "A Journey on the Trail of Nuclear Crimes." These trails they have discovered everywhere—in Moscow and Chelyabinsk, Yekaterinburg, and Semipalatinsk, in the Russian and Kazakh hamlets forgotten by the authorities, in the forests and rivers, in hospitals and factories.

The trip resulted in a 52-minute film, which will be shown on 23 September in France by the FR-3 television station within the framework of the popular weekly broadcast "March of the Century". Its authors are the three well-known French television journalists Erve Bryuzini, Dominique Ters, and Jean-Francois Renu, which were accompanied by the scientist Vladimir Lelekov, who for 20 years worked in the Institute for Atomic Energy imeni Kurchatov.

In this film—at least for the inhabitants of the former Soviet Union—to all appearances, there are no sensations of any kind. Most likely, our television and press have already talked about everything in the last few years. And nevertheless, the blood turns cold when they show the newly-born cripples and the sick children where they conducted tests for many years. When you listen to the story of the man who during 2 years of military service had to measure the level of radiation right away after the nuclear explosion. When you see the 18-year old girl who works in a plant whose radiation level exceeds the norm ten-fold. "But where to disappear to?" she asks expressing doom.

"Similarly to how the forest is not visible for the trees, so after Chernobyl it was impossible for a long time to recognize the real dimensions of the nuclear catastrophe, to which your country has fallen a victim during the past 40 years," says Dominique Ters after viewing the film arranged for your [as published] correspondent. "And up to now, its consequences remain unknown. The Soviet authorities knew how to conceal their crimes. All of them were perpetrated behind closed doors, in cities and settlements to which access was prohibited. Without any witnesses. Or almost without them.

Today, it goes without saying, it is much more simple to find witnesses than a few years ago. One of them, Viktor Alekseyevich Galoshchalov (all Russian surnames were recorded by the French by ear, and for this reason, regrettably, they may contain errors), during 1962 to 1963 served at the nuclear testing range in Semipalatinsk, where in those two years almost 100 tests were conducted. Together with other soldiers, he had to measure the radiation right away after the explosion. "We were guinea-pigs," he says.

Guinea-pigs, as it turned out, the French journalists think, were also the inhabitants of near-by villages in the region where in 40 years 689 explosions were conducted. "We did not think," the Kazakh physician says, "that one could act in such a way with respect to one's people. . . ."

35 years ago, the nuclear waste deposit not far from Chelyabinsk exploded, and as a result a minimum of 270,000 people found themselves in a radioactive cloud. To this day, the public does not fully know what happened at that time, and up to now the consequences of the explosion have not been eliminated.

... an enormous open deposit of uranium ore in Aktau (Kazakhstan), which is being exploited since 1964. Kazakh uranium is one of the cheapest and is being successfully exported. The director of the factory for its enrichment, Aleksandr Yakovlev, asserts that the level of radiation in his enterprise is five times lower than the admissible medical level and that the workers have excellent protection from their simple dark-blue overalls. However, the instruments of the Parisian journalists showed 5,700 microroentgen, which, in their words, is 230 times higher than the level that exists in French nuclear power stations.

"These are enormous and inadmissible doses," is the commentary on the readings from people's deputy Nikolay Valitskiy, who himself has been working for almost 30 years in this factory. "The workers work here and have absolutely no information of any kind about the dosages of irradiation to which they are subjected. This is inhumane. . . . Yes, people are silent. We have become used to live like this. . . ."

For the burial of radioactive waste from the factory, beginning in 1970, they use the lake that is situated not far from the Caspian Sea, whose water in its turn is threatened with poisoning. A new Caspian Chernobyl may happen, N. Valitskiy warns, as a result the whole region will prove to be infected.

Is it possible that nothing has changed here during the past years, the Frenchmen want to know. "We have been told that you have democracy now."

"You have seen this democracy," comes the answer of one of the participants of the film, lieutenant-colonel Tukin, who is fighting for the rights of the radiation victims. "Where is this democracy? Some people have replaced others. As far as the new structures are concerned, they are quite unable to do anything. Unfortunately, they have become as corrupt as those which existed previously. And sometimes even more so."

"This film and broadcast which we are preparing," Erve Bryuzini tells me, "is a warning, above all, to all Western countries. What has taken place in the former Soviet Union is directly relevant also to France and to the United States. When the explosion occurred in Chelyabinsk, the CIA and the French secret services found out about it at once. But the authorities, which were informed by them, were silent, no one reacted. Why? Information about the nuclear explosion would have alarmed the Western public and thereby would have threatened our nuclear program."

"That was the silence of accomplices," E. Bryuzini continues. For this reason, the West bears part of the

responsibility for what happened in your country. Not long ago, the director of the CIA, Gates, declared that the radioactive pollution in the CIS is a genuine catastrophe. For its elimination, in his words, tens of billions of dollars and many decades are needed. We want to ask Gates, whom we invited to our broadcast: Why were you silent at that time?"

"Yes, nuclear punctures have occurred also in the West," E. Bryuzini remarks, "but in contrast to the USSR, our public found out about them more frequently. In your country, the victims themselves had to sign not to divulge the secret, they assumed the obligation not to tell anyone about their approaching death. . . . I am struck by the fact that up to now your population does not understand all the dangers connected with radiation. One of the directors of the Siberian Division of the Academy of Sciences quite seriously tried to convince us: The people cannot be told anything since we cannot do anything to help it. Such information, in his opinion, will only call forth panic and stresses and nothing more. But even if this is so, it is impossible to conceal the truth. Concealing it from people, you will never find the solution of the problem."

Geologist Blames PRC Nuclear Test for Quake

PM1409151592 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Sep 92 p 4

[Report by Zaur Kadymbekov under the "Hypotheses" rubric: "Secret of Nature's Indignation"]

[Text] Baku—A destructive earthquake in Kyrgyzstan might have been caused by a nuclear explosion conducted in China in May this year.

This was the conclusion reached by a leading specialist in the sphere of earthquakes triggered by nuclear explosions—Professor Ikram Kerimov, deputy director of the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences Institute of Geology.

Declassification of hitherto secret work has shown that the opinion expressed by the Azerbaijani scientist should be treated in all seriousness. Back in 1978 he was the first to determine a link between the destructive earthquake in Gazli and the nuclear tests on the Semipalatinsk site, and he advanced a supposition about the possibility of powerful new shocks in the next few years. A repeat earthquake in Gazli in 1984 confirmed that the scientist was right.

I. Kerimov subsequently revealed a natural law governing a change in seismic murmurs before an earthquake, which was registered as a scientific discovery.

I. Kerimov said in conversation that the impact of technology on nature is now becoming so serious and is threatening the safety of mankind, that all activity in this area must be placed under strict international control.

Ministers Inspect Novaya Zemlya Test Site

*LD1609091292 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0814 GMT 16 Sep 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow September 16 TASS—A mixed commission led by the Russian defence minister, Army General Pavel Grachev, and the Russian nuclear power engineering minister, Professor Viktor Mikhailov, was flown to the Novaya Zemlya nuclear testing site to study on the spot the state and potential of the structures and problems facing the nuclear testing site personnel.

On Tuesday, the Russian Navy's Commander-in-Chief Admiral Felix Gromov arrived on the spot as the facilities on Novaya Zemlya are under the jurisdiction of the Russian Navy.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Draft CW Pact of 'Great Significance'

*PM0809155092 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 Sep 92 p 3*

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Press Service report: "All's Well That Ends Well"]

[Text] Work on the draft Convention on a Total Ban on the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction—work under way for 20 years—has been completed. The convention was approved at this year's last plenary session of the Disarmament Conference, held at the end of last week.

There is no doubt that this document will be a very important international act in the sphere of arms control. It will ban a whole class of weapons of mass destruction—and not only their use but also their storage and production. At the same time the convention provides for specific deadlines for destroying the existing stocks of chemical weapons and very strict control over the implementation of its requirements. It is also proposed to ease to some extent the financial burden on those countries that are to eliminate their means of chemical warfare. This is of special significance for Russia, which has particularly large stocks of combat toxins and, as is well known, is experiencing great economic difficulties today.

After the draft convention's approval at the Disarmament Conference, it will be forwarded for examination to the next session of the UN General Assembly, which is to open at the end of the month. Later the signing of this document will begin in Paris, obviously at the beginning of next year. It will enter into force after being signed and ratified by 65 participant states.

Despite the fact that, in the opinion of a number of countries, including Russia, the draft convention

approved in Geneva suffers from a number of shortcomings, its adoption will be of very great significance for strengthening international security, eliminating the threat of war, and strengthening confidence among states.

U.S.-UK-Russian Statement on Biological Weapons

*LD1409102892 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1021 GMT 14 Sep 92*

[Text] Moscow September 14 TASS—Britain, the Russian Federation and the United States have adopted a joint statement on biological weapons as a result of meetings of senior officials of those countries, held in Moscow between September 10 and 11. The three governments reiterated their allegiance to the observance of the convention on biological weapons and voiced their agreement with the fact that their armies should not be equipped with biological weapons.

During the meetings the Russian Government announced that it had taken a number of measures to ease concern, connected with the implementation of the convention on biological weapons. The measures include the reduction by 50 per cent of the personnel involved in the fulfillment of military biological programmes and the reduction of the financing of biological research for military purposes by 30 per cent. It also pointed out that President Yeltsin had issued on April 11, 1992, a decree on ensuring the fulfillment of international commitments in the sphere of biological weapons.

The governments of the three countries agreed to create working groups, including experts, which will monitor the fulfillment of the convention on biological weapons. They will have the right to visit any military biological facility.

Officials Announce Accord on Biological Weapons

*LD1409132992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1250 GMT 14 Sep 92*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Boris Krivoshey]

[Text] Moscow September 14 TASS—"Great Britain, the United States, the Russian Federation have confirmed their adherence to the strict fulfilment of a convention on biological weapons and adopted a joint statement on biological weapons as a result of meetings between heads of the delegations of these countries which were held in Moscow," Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Grigoriy Berdennikov said at a briefing here on Monday [14 September].

"For the first time an agreement was reached at a high level on mechanisms for control the implementation of a convention on biological weapons, which will function on a tripartite basis," Major-General Valentin

Yevstigneev, a representative of the Russian Defence Ministry, said at the briefing.

He emphasised that an agreement was reached in principle on such measures and mechanisms for control of biological facilities, including military ones, which exclude the possibility of developing offensive programmes in the future.

He voiced hope that a more precise agreement would be reached on the basis of the cooperation between Russia, Great Britain and the United States on the banned and allowed activities of biological facilities, and that the previously adopted convention would be improved.

Promise to Curtail Military Biological Programs

*MK1509083992 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Sep 92 p 1*

[Report by Dmitriy Frolov under the "Security" rubric: "Russia Promises To Discontinue Production of Bacteriological Weapons. Military Maintains That Americans Confused Them With Veterinary Scientists."]

[Text] Officials representing the Governments of the Russian Federation, Great Britain, and the United States, who met at the end of last week in Moscow to examine a number of mutual concerns in connection with the observance of the 1972 Convention on Biological and Toxic Weapons, confirmed on behalf of their governments the aspiration to comply with the convention in full.

The statement by the Russian delegation, headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Berdennikov, looked particularly impressive, inasmuch as it was Russia's position on this issue that—not without justification—has long been a source of concern to the West. According to the current official version, our developments in the field of biological weaponry began in 1946 and continued for 20 years, even after the signing of the convention. We are talking here about so-called offensive research, which was ended by a decree of the Russian president dated 11 April 1992 that deemed the research to be illegal. In implementation of the decree, a number of steps have been taken. The British and Americans have been informed about these steps by the Russian representatives.

In the Ministry of Defense the directorate responsible for the offensive biological program has been eliminated, while the dismantling of the experimental production lines for "biological compounds" and the closure of the biological weapons testing facility have been announced. Even the very wording looks sensational—literally one month ago the military specialists, as well as the diplomats, were unable to utter anything of the sort, categorically denying everything and speaking only about the testing of protective gear [sredstva zashchity]. However, no one was going to hide the fact that the line between the latter and tests of weaponry is a fine one that can easily be crossed.

Now a 50-percent reduction in personnel engaged in military biological programs has been announced, along with a 30-percent cut in funding. For understandable reasons no absolute figures were cited. However, General Valentin Yevstigneyev, deputy chief of the Radiation, Biological, and Chemical Protection Directorate, explained to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's correspondent that these percentages were obtained as a result of the closure of a facility on Vozrozhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea (Kazakhstan) and four departments in the Russian Armed Forces' Central Institute of Microbiology directly linked to it. If you consider the fact that the site was located on the territory of a sovereign state, and its viability required the expenditure of much effort and resources, then it can be supposed that the decision on its closure has removed a number of the military's problems, including those related to increased public attention.

Now the center of attention has shifted to the Institute of Especially Pure Biological Preparations in St. Petersburg. A rumor has been circulating concerning work there on strains of plague bacteria. The military, however, maintains that it has been five years since it placed any orders with St. Petersburg, and it explains that incident as a defect in the work of the relevant structures of the interested states, which have confused the plague with the so-called "hen cholera," a vaccine that has been worked on in St. Petersburg together with the Veterinary Institute. Nevertheless, American and British experts have been invited to take part in an investigation. To judge by all appearances, this will be the first measure in an extensive program on the exchange of observers, independent experts, and scientists with a view to "eliminating ambiguities." Specialists, however, consider the main verification [kontrol] problem to be the absence of a mechanism and specific criteria in the existing convention, which renders many reciprocal claims unsubstantiated. There is yet another problem that will have to be resolved in the long term: international cooperation in creating a system of protection against biological weapons, which have been called "the poor states' atomic bomb." It is known that Iraq has exerted considerable efforts to create biological weapons, and it is most probable that it is not alone in this respect.

Official Cited on Western Accusations of BW Research

*PM1509201392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Sep 92 p 3*

[Report by Aleksandr Golts: "Intelligence Report Was Inaccurate, But It Appears Neither We Nor the West Suffered"]

[Text] This story, which began as a run-of-the-mill diplomatic scandal from the period of confrontation, is continuing wholly in the spirit of the new times. And it will end, perhaps, with the elimination of what Grigoriy

Berdennikov, Russian deputy foreign minister, called one of the last "ailments of the cold war."

Recently Western Governments were, to put it mildly, inaccurately informed by their own special services, who took a fowl plague vaccine which the St. Petersburg Institute of Specially Pure Biological Preparations was producing to be military research banned by the 1972 convention. Some fairly harsh statements addressed to Moscow then ensued. The West asked: What about Boris Yeltsin's promises to end the violations of the ban on the development of biological weapons [BW] which the USSR used to commit in the past? The foreign press went even further and drew the conclusion that the Russian President has no control over his generals.

According to the "conventional" pattern of confrontation we should have responded with sharp rebuttals and counteraccusations. Especially since the Russian military experts also have grounds for suspicion.

However, instead of a futile exchange of recriminations a different path was chosen. Delegations from Russia, the United States, and Britain headed by the deputy chiefs of the respective foreign policy departments met in Moscow. The delegations consisted of representatives of the leaderships of the defense ministries and other government institutions. As a result of the consultations Russia proved by means of facts that it has terminated offensive biological research and scrapped the infrastructure for conducting that research, dismantled the production lines, and closed down the test facilities. The Russian president also ordered an examination of the Institute of Specially Pure Biological Preparations in St. Petersburg in which foreign experts could take part. Furthermore, we agreed to let the foreign representatives visit any nonmilitary installation. So long as commercial information is respected, of course.

But this is not a unilateral concession, as Grigoriy Berdennikov, deputy foreign minister, and Major General of the Medical Service Valentin Yevstigneyev, deputy chief of the Defense Ministry's Directorate of Radiation, Biological, and Chemical Protection, stressed in conversation with journalists. There will be similar visits to U.S. and British installations on the same basis.

Last and most important. The representatives of the Russian foreign policy and military departments pointed out that the main success of the talks was that a move has been made toward creating a mechanism to monitor the observance of the provisions of the 1972 convention. This is an extraordinarily difficult thing to do because the distinction between the development of biological weapons and the creation of the means of protection against them is a very fine one. Nevertheless, the absence of such a mechanism, as Grigoriy Berdennikov stressed, creates scope for mutual suspicions. It has been decided to create expert working groups to examine the possibility of inspecting military biological installations and to elaborate other measures to monitor [kontrol] the

fulfillment of the convention. In particular, the infrastructure of biological installations in the three countries will be studied to determine whether they have any special equipment and excess potential incompatible with commitments made. Meanwhile, according to Gen. Yevstigneyev, experts will exchange specific proposals in the very near future. So, instead of fueling a propaganda war the sides have opted for difficult but constructive talks.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Retention of Nuclear Arms by Ukraine Favored

92UN2054A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
29 Aug 92 p 6, 1 Sep 92 p 6

[Article by Ukraine People's Deputy Yuriy Kostenko:
"Ukraine's Nuclear Weapons: Good or Evil"]

[29 Aug p 6]

[Text] On 16 July 1990, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet approved the Declaration of Ukraine's Sovereignty as a State, which proclaimed its intention to become a nuclear-free state in the future. Nuclear disarmament has been one of the leading questions since then. The subsequent Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declaration of 24 October 1991 on Ukraine's nuclear-free status and the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet decree of 9 April 1992 "On additional steps to ensure that Ukraine acquires nuclear-free status" attest to this. These documents incorporate the legal foundations and mechanisms to abolish the most destructive weapons created in the history of mankind. Ukraine, which had already been overtaken by the Chernobyl disaster, became the first republic of the former USSR to initiate destruction of the nuclear arsenals on its territory.

However, as surprising as it may seem, it is precisely Ukraine's nuclear policy which is the subject of the most political speculation by various foreign public figures, and even those that are homegrown. The question arises: nuclear weapons for Ukraine—good or evil? Should they be given up to someone or should we destroy them ourselves?.. And finally, who will defend us after nuclear disarmament, and with what? The reader will find answers to these questions in the following article.

I. WHOSE ARSENALS ARE THEY?

First let us try to clearly define the political and legal status of the states on whose territory the nuclear arsenals of the former USSR are located and the right to own these weapons. In accordance with the standards of international law, all the states formed on the territory of the USSR become its legal successors with respect to its physical assets and its international commitments. In being guided by precisely these standards, Western creditors made it incumbent not only on Russia, but the other independent states (including Ukraine) to pay off all the debts of the former USSR. So based on these

standards, Ukraine, together with Belarus and Kazakhstan, are not only *de facto*, but *de jure* nuclear states on a level with Russia. On the other hand, except for Russia, not one of these states has the complete technological cycle to manufacture nuclear weapons, and under the provisions of another international document, namely the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, such states fall in the non-nuclear category.

The attempt by certain jurists and experts to equate the situation with respect to nuclear arsenals which has taken shape in the territory of the former USSR with the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in certain countries of Western Europe is unacceptable. They delivered the weapons there in finished form, while Ukraine, along with the other republics, took part firsthand in developing the USSR's nuclear arsenals, contributing substantial intellectual potential and vast material resources to this work. Finally, the United States' recognition of Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia as a collective party to the Treaty on Reducing and Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms (SOA) also attests to the fact that the nuclear potential of the former USSR is divided among the new states.

Our internal legal documents relating to nuclear weapons which have been approved by the Supreme Soviet mention only Ukraine's intention to become nuclear-free in the future. But today, it is not only premature, but dangerous, to speak about our state as if it did not possess nuclear weapons. As an example, let us try to proceed from the assumption that it has nuclear-free status. Legal problems immediately arise with regard to the strategic nuclear missiles located in Ukraine's territory. Whose weapons are these? When the USSR existed, everything was simple then—they belonged to it. If the Soviet Union had remained and Ukraine had left it after the December referendum, the status of the nuclear arsenals on Ukraine's territory would have been unchanged—they would have been the weapons of another state, that is, the USSR.

After the union's disintegration, the situation was fundamentally changed. Now there are two possible alternatives for dividing the nuclear arsenals. The first is when the states on whose territory the nuclear weapons are located become their owners; this conforms to the 1983 Vienna Convention on the Legal Succession of States, incidentally. The second is when only Russia becomes the owner, and this basically coincides with the provisions of the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is not right to consider the nuclear weapons as CIS property—the CIS is not a state, after all. Based on the first alternative, Ukraine, as the owner of nuclear weapons, may assume any obligations concerning them and have full control over and responsibility for the process of their destruction. In this case, it is logical and correct for Ukraine to be added, as a party with equal rights, to the Treaty on Reducing and Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms which was concluded between the former USSR and the United States in July 1991.

But if only Russia is considered the owner of nuclear weapons, Ukraine cannot assume responsibility for nuclear disarmament on its territory—after all, you cannot destroy what does not belong to you. In this situation, Ukraine's role and participation in the Treaty on Reducing and Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms becomes incomprehensible. In addition, the presence of the nuclear weapons of another state (Russia) on our territory over an extended period (the process of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament may last for 7 to 10 years) comes into conflict with the principles which Ukraine proclaimed—remaining outside of power blocs [vneblokrovost], and it will hamper our integration among the countries of Western Europe. And finally, the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine has not given its consent to leave all rights and responsibility for ownership of the former USSR's nuclear weapons with Russia alone. That is, the second possible alternative in the division of nuclear arsenals is completely at variance with our laws.

So the majority of political and legal problems associated with the elimination of nuclear weapons may be resolved successfully only if Ukraine is the owner of the nuclear potential of the former USSR which is located on its territory and only if it has the temporary status of a nuclear state.

TO DESTROY IS NOT TO BUILD

The destruction of nuclear weapons, just as their development, requires the solution of complex scientific and technical questions, which entails substantial material outlays, by the way. For this reason, a technical and economic analysis of possible alternatives in salvaging the missile complexes is needed, especially as it is extremely difficult to invest funds in this work during conditions of economic crisis. First of all, we must work out safe technologies for the disassembly and salvage work. Two types of strategic nuclear missiles with liquid and solid fuel are based on Ukraine's territory. The liquid-propellant delivery vehicles are filled with highly toxic components—combustible heptyl and an amyl oxidizing agent. As far as the amyl is concerned, it can be processed at chemical enterprises in Ukraine, although all this will require substantial funds. We have no technology for processing and storing the extraordinarily toxic heptyl, which is equivalent to the toxicity of chemical agents, at present. There is no technological process for salvaging the solid-propellant delivery platforms, either. However, taking into account Ukraine's high scientific and technical potential, as well as the presence of "Yuzhmash," the enterprise which makes the missile delivery platforms, we may expect that such technological processes will be developed in the very near future.

Salvaging the nuclear warhead of a strategic missile is not a simple matter, either, because Ukraine lacks the appropriate enterprises and specialists. In spite of this, we can agree completely with the conclusions by certain departments about the simple transfer of warheads to Russia. Without resorting to a detailed analysis of all the

possible losses from such a transfer, let us turn our attention to the following. The nose sections contain uranium and plutonium—materials which were obtained as the result of vast intellectual and material outlays. They have an estimated value on the international market of up to \$100 million for a metric ton of uranium and from \$500 million to \$1 billion for a metric ton of plutonium. In addition, highly enriched uranium and plutonium are exceptionally valuable sources of energy. Plutonium is valued at up to \$30 per gram in power engineering, for example. For this reason, it is expedient to reuse them for power engineering needs. So highly enriched uranium may be blended with crude uranium in a concentration of up to 3 to 5 percent and utilized for the fuel elements of nuclear electric power stations. Since Ukraine lacks enterprises with the full technological cycle for uranium enrichment and manufacturing the fuel elements for an AES [nuclear electric power station], use of the highly enriched uranium from nuclear warheads may help to resolve the problem of nuclear fuel for our AES's.

(To be continued)

[1 Sep p 6]

[Text] The problem of utilizing the plutonium from nuclear warheads is very complicated. Technological processes for blending plutonium with uranium and using this mixture for power engineering needs exist in Great Britain, France, and the FRG as well. But this fuel is used in special reactors which Ukraine does not have. The direct use of plutonium in the new-generation reactors, which should be built between the years 2010 and 2015, is considered to be more promising. We know that further development of nuclear power engineering will become possible only if closed technological cycles are created for the use of radioactive substances formed in the process of nuclear reactions. According to experts' estimates, more than 200 metric tons of plutonium have been accumulated in just the non-nuclear states today, and the development of plutonium reactors will enable nuclear power engineering to function without waste. Japan, which has already undertaken implementation of its "plutonium project," intends to develop a stockpile of 400 metric tons in 30 years. When the oil and coal fields are exhausted, plutonium will become one of the most valuable energy-producing materials, comparable with gold in value. So it is expedient to retain the plutonium, which will become available in the course of eliminating Ukraine's nuclear arsenals, as a promising source of energy for the new-generation nuclear electric power stations.

Taking into account the data cited, Ukraine's economic losses will be lowest if the main parts of strategic missiles with nuclear warheads are salvaged by a similar method. In the first stage, it is advisable to have the nuclear warheads disassembled at enterprises in Russia under the condition that part of the uranium and plutonium that is released is returned to Ukraine. Settlements for such collaboration may be based on the pattern of world

prices for nuclear materials. And they should include the value of the tactical nuclear weapons taken out of Ukraine previously. At the same time, we have to build our own specialized enterprises to handle the full technological cycle for enriching the uranium and producing the AES fuel elements and enterprises for processing radioactive waste at which nuclear weapons could be salvaged. It will become simply impossible for our nuclear electric power stations to function safely without such production facilities. On the other hand, Ukraine's participation in dismantling nuclear weapons under international supervision will make it possible to substantially reduce the workload at enterprises in Russia, which will not be able to dismantle such a vast number of weapons in the periods of time stipulated by the agreements. As far as keeping nuclear weapon secrets is concerned, all the special types of work may be performed by specialists from Russia on a contract basis. Other operations which are not secret may be performed by Ukrainian and Western specialists.

We need to carefully analyze the Treaty on Reducing and Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms, guided by our national interests, before its ratification by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. The provisions of this treaty were worked out when the USSR and the United States were opponents, and Ukraine had no part in its development. But now the political situation has changed drastically, the USSR no longer exists, and many requirements have become outdated and economically pointless. Yes, it is hard to agree now with such provisions of the treaty as the need to destroy the launch silos for strategic missiles. After all, these strongly engineered structures may be used successfully for the needs of agriculture and scientific purposes. Ukraine also needs to define the terms for destroying nuclear weapons located in its territory. It has to be guided here not by emotions such as "Let's do it faster" or the opposite, "Let us wait," but by economic considerations and the opportunity to conduct the work by taking into account requirements for the physical and ecological safety of the weapons and delivery systems which are to be destroyed. Based precisely on these considerations, the latest decree of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet "On additional steps to ensure that Ukraine acquires nuclear-free status" also provides for the entire range of questions related to the destruction of nuclear weapons on Ukraine's territory to be examined from the standpoint of safety guarantees and Ukraine's foreign policy interests, and for specific terms of their elimination to be established only after this comprehensive analysis.

IF WE DESTROY THE WEAPONS, WHAT DO WE DEFEND OURSELVES WITH?

There is one more extremely important problem which must be resolved in the process of destroying the nuclear arsenals—the problem of guaranteeing Ukraine's national security after nuclear disarmament. In the system of national security for states, nuclear weapons are considered in most cases not as a means of aggression, but as an effective means of deterring aggression.

Under current conditions, the security of a state is guaranteed for the most part by one of three factors: military or economic power or a high degree of political and economic integration with other states. For example, aggression against Switzerland, where a substantial amount of the world's capital is kept, automatically means a threat to the economy of other states. Unfortunately, none of these security systems can be applied in full measure to Ukraine today. Our military potential (without nuclear weapons) and our economic potential are not in a position to fully protect us from aggression, and Ukraine is integrated primarily with republics of the former USSR, chiefly Russia, which is far from being stable itself. Consequently, Ukraine will need the protection of influential states after nuclear disarmament. But the usual protection in such cases, a so-called "nuclear umbrella" provided by Russia or the United States, or else a military-political alliance made up of the CIS or NATO, is unacceptable for Ukraine, since this runs counter to a principle followed by our state: remaining outside of power blocs. So Ukraine is left with the path of intensive political and economic integration with the countries of Western Europe. The extent of this integration and the rate of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament should be interdependent. Figuratively speaking, the last strategic missile located on Ukrainian soil should be destroyed when Ukraine's lot is cast with that of the many states in Europe. Under such an approach, Ukraine will gradually replace one of the military factors (nuclear weapons) in its national security system, without threatening its interests, with another one—integration with the developed states. In all the other cases, Ukraine's nuclear disarmament will not make up for all the losses in the system of national security, and it therefore will not meet our state's national interests. We have a right to count on broad international support in destroying nuclear weapons, as well as on assistance in the processes of Ukraine's integration in the political and economic structures of the West.

In this connection, certain restrictions by the COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Export Control] (the international organization called upon to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons) as applied to Ukraine will need to be reconsidered. As we know from experience, the COCOM is not in a position to stop the spread of nuclear technologies, and a number of non-nuclear states are now close to producing nuclear weapons. On the other hand, this organization's activity interferes with the exchange of new technologies and is often used to advantage in the competitive struggle. As far as Ukraine is concerned, the COCOM has prevented us from putting our missile delivery systems, which are almost the best in their parameters and quality, on the world market. And this is at a time when the world is waiting 7 to 10 years to have artificial satellites launched.

So acquiring non-nuclear status is an extremely difficult and lengthy process which requires that a number of political and legal, scientific and technical, and economic problems be resolved and that new mechanisms

be developed to guarantee Ukraine's national security. Historically, nuclear weapons were created almost collectively, and two hostile camps were drawn into this process. At the same time, these weapons constitute a threat to all mankind, and most of the world's states should be concerned with eliminating them. For this reason, any attempts to shift all the responsibility for destroying nuclear arsenals to individual states are futile.

Ukrainian-Russian-CIS Talks on Nuclear Weapons

*LD1009145792 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1405 GMT 10 Sep 92*

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Nikolay Zaika for TASS]

[Text] Kiev, 10 Sep—Questions of the continued stationing of strategic nuclear weapons on Ukraine territory were discussed at the meeting in Kiev between Ukrainian Defense Minister Colonel General Konstantin Morozov; Air Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth countries; and Major General Viktor Koldunov, a representative of the Russian Defense Ministry.

During the meeting it was noted that Ukraine's desire to achieve the status of a nonnuclear power remained unchanged, but for the present it is implementing administrative management [administrativnoye rukovodstvo] of the nuclear forces and control [kontrol] over their use.

Ukraine's position on the problem under discussion, Col. Gen. Morozov stressed, proceeds from the position that all questions of reducing Ukraine's strategic nuclear forces should be resolved on the basis of international treaties and special agreements to ensure the security of the state and on mutually advantageous conditions.

Ukrainian Official on Nuclear Weapons Policy

*LD1309204292 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program
Network in Ukrainian 0500 GMT 13 Sep 92*

[Text] Ukraine's position of principle regarding strategic nuclear weapons consists of the idea that they must be destroyed within a period of seven years. This was stated by Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, representative of the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine, dealing with issues of arms limitation and disarmament.

He stressed that nuclear weapons must be under a single operational command, and administrative issues must be settled by the Defense Ministry of Ukraine and by other government institutions. As far as control over the use of nuclear weapons is concerned, Kostyantyn Hryshchenko said that Ukraine insisted on implementing technical measures that would assure the Ukrainian side that strategic nuclear missiles will not be launched from its territory against other countries of the world. There is certain progress now, the representative of the Foreign

Affairs Ministry stressed, but the Ukrainian side is not completely satisfied on this issue.

Leaders on Strategic Nuclear Forces Status

Yeltsin Aide on Russia's View

OW1709064992 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0529 GMT 17 Sep 92

[Interview with Aleksandr Kotenko, head of the president's State Legal Department, by correspondent Marina Chernukha; from "Problems & Opinions"—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Correspondent: Many experts believe that in Bishkek the status of the strategic nuclear forces will become a stumbling block once again. Three of the four states possessing nuclear weapons have different views on this problem. What is the essence of their disagreements?

Kotenko: The Alma-Ata agreements, as you know, envisage the concentration of the strategic nuclear forces in the Russian Federation following their complete removal from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The document does not specify, however, how exactly the transfer and elimination of nuclear missiles will proceed. This explains why the states in question have different approaches to the problem.

Belarus, for instance, has agreed to have its strategic missiles removed from its territory. Incidentally, according to the Soviet-American agreement, missiles of this class shall not come under cuts. As Belarus has declared its nuclear-free status, it has put its nuclear missiles under Russia's jurisdiction, so now the strategic forces located in Belarus belong to Russia and will be gradually removed from Belarus. This is the essence of the so-called special position of Belarus. We welcome such an approach to the problem, given the nuclear-free status proclaimed by Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

The missiles located in Ukraine will be eliminated in accordance with the agreement on the strategic offensive weapons. Ukraine insists that these weapons be eliminated in its territory according to the fixed schedule. Another problem is that the procedure of eliminating the warheads has not been developed yet. Should these warheads be eliminated in Russia, or, as Ukraine insists, on Ukrainian territory, which is absolutely inconceivable? I think common sense will triumph and nuclear missiles will be removed from Ukraine to Russia.

The position of Kazakhstan has become more problematic lately, perhaps due to certain misunderstanding or haste in the moves made by both Kazakhstan and Russian leaders. Following the appointment of Russia's commander-in-chief for the strategic missiles, the leaders of Kazakhstan made a step of about the same nature, which instantly cast a doubt on Kazakhstan's nuclear-free status. Nazarbayev stated at the same time

that he was ready to put Kazakhstan's strategic forces under Shaposhnikov's command in accordance with the Alma-Ata agreements.

I think, the problem should be approached from this particular angle. I am convinced that as far as the strategy and the strategic forces are concerned, we shall find a mutually acceptable solution based on the provisions of the Alma-Ata agreement, above all centralized control over the nuclear forces, preferably within the framework of the CIS chief command. However, we must not fail to determine to which states these forces will belong.

The nuclear-free status of the three states does not allow them to possess nuclear weapons. These weapons must belong to Russia because Russia bears the entire responsibility for them. However, as long as they are located in other states, control functions should be performed with the participation of the Joint Armed Forces.

If you remember, according to the Alma-Ata agreement, the right to decide whether or not to use nuclear weapons has been entrusted upon the president of the Russian Federation who will take such a decision by agreement with the presidents of the states in which nuclear weapons are located. Commander-in-Chief Shaposhnikov bears the entire responsibility for this decision because the Alma-Ata agreement puts nuclear missiles under his direct control. Now we should be looking for an interim solution.

Q: I understand, there is no need to have the CIS agreements on strategic forces cardinally amended.

A: I don't think there is any need to do so, although certain changes will have to be made. These agreements put the nuclear strategic forces under the CIS commander-in-chief's direct control, which lend the nuclear forces an extra-state status. Meanwhile, according to international norms, nuclear forces cannot have such a status. In view of this, they should be put under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.

As to decision-making, to be more exact, the implementation of the Russian president's decisions on the use of nuclear weapons, as long as they are located in different states, it should become the responsibility of the Joint Armed Forces' commander-in-chief. So these forces will belong to Russia, while the Russian Federation's defense minister will exercise tactical control over them, maintain them and supply them with personnel.

The only thing he cannot do is to issue the order to use them, for this is the prerogative of the president and of the Joint Armed Forces' commander-in-chief. When all of the strategic forces are either moved over to Russia, or eliminated in the places of their dislocation, the Russian president will assume the decision-making functions and have his decisions implemented through bodies subordinated directly to him.

I think that the special position of Kazakhstan and Ukraine will make us seek a solution whereby the command concerning the use of nuclear forces during the transitional period will be issued by Commander-in-Chief Shaposhnikov. We need to achieve a compromise here. A tough stance assumed by any of the parties concerned may undermine our international prestige and lead the violations of international accords, above all the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

Shaposhnikov on States' Positions

*LD1609192992 Moscow Radio Moscow in French
1600 GMT 16 Sep 92*

[Text] Until now the future of the strategic nuclear weapons of the former USSR have been one of the focal points of interest of the international community. Our correspondent spoke about this question with Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, the commander in chief of the CIS joint Armed Forces.

All the states of the CIS have said that they want to get rid of nuclear weapons, including the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, where these arms are located, said Marshal Shaposhnikov. Only the Russian federation will possess nuclear arms. These are political statements, but how are they going to be put into effect in concrete terms, asked our correspondent, as it is no secret to anyone that this is the subject of stormy debate?


With regard to these strategic forces, there are three possible approaches, said the commander in chief of the CIS joint Armed Forces. The Ukraine's position is the first one, that of Kazakhstan the second, and that of Belarus the third. Kazakhstan would like them to come under the responsibility of the joint armed forces command. Russia and Belarus are holding talks for the strategic nuclear arms sited in Belarusian territory to be placed under the jurisdiction of Russia. As for the Ukraine, said Marshal Shaposhnikov, it is insisting on administrative dependence of the strategic nuclear arms sited on its territory. That means that the officers and soldiers swear loyalty to the Ukraine, it also means the appointment of a command, funding and so on. To some extent this approach of the Ukraine is not based on the agreements concluded earlier within the framework of the CIS.

The task of the general command of the CIS joint Armed Forces and the representatives of the defense ministries of the states of the Community is to adapt all these approaches to the agreements reached by the former USSR and those concluded by the leaders of the CIS. At present we are in charge of the strategic nuclear forces of the former USSR in accordance with the agreements reached by the leaders of the CIS in Alma-Ata and Minsk, and at the moment there is no doubt that this mechanism works, said Marshal Shaposhnikov.

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